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INTRODUCTION 
The Russian Revolution was fought nnder the banner of Marxism. 
I n  the years of propaganda before the first World War the Bolshevist 
Party came forward es the champion of Marxist ideas and tactics. 
It worked along with the radical tendencies in the socialist parties 
of Western Europe, which were alao steeped in Marxian theory, 
whereas the Menshevist Party corresponded rather to the reformist 
tendencies over here. I n  theoretical wntroversies the Bolshevist 
authors, besidesl the so-cded Austrian and Dutch schools of Marxism, 
came forward as the defenders of rigid Marxist doctrines. In the 
Revolution the Bolshevists, who now had adopted the name of Com- 
munist Party, could win because they put up as the leading principle 
of their fight the class war of the working masses against the bour- 
geoisie. Thus Lenin and his party, in theory and prahtice, stood as 
the foremast representatives of Marxism. 
Then? however, a contradiction appeared. In Russia a system of 
state-capitalism consolidated itself, not by deviating from but by fol- 
lowing Lenin 's ideas (e.g. ip his ' ' State and Revolution ") . A new 
dominating and exploiting claw came into power over the working 
clam. But at  the same time Marxism was fostered, and proclaimed 
the fundamental basis of the Russian state. In Moscow a "Marx- 
Engels Institute" was founded that collected with care and reverence 
all the well-nigh lost and forgotten works and manuscripb of the 
masters and published them' in excellent editions. Whereas the Com- 
munist Parties, directed by the Moscow Cornintern, refer to Marxism 
as their guiding doctrine, they meet with more and more opposition 
from the most advanced workers in Western Europe and America, 
most radically from the ranks of Council-communism. These contra- 
dictions, extending over all important problems of life and of the 
social stmggle, can be cleared up only by penetrating into the deepest, 
i.e. the philosophical, principles of what is called Marxism in these 
different trends of thought. 
Lenin gave an exposition of his philosophical ideas in his work 
' ' Materialism and Empiriocriticism " that appeared in Russian in 
1908, and was published in 1927 in German and in English- transla- 
tions. Some of the Russian socialist intellectuals about 1904 had taken 
an interest in modern Western natural philosophy, especially in the 
ideas of Ernst Mach, and tried to combine these with Marxism. A 
kind of "Machism", with Bogdanov, Lenin's most intimate collabor- 
ator, and Lunatcharsb as spokesmen, developed as an influential 
trend in the socialist party. After the first revolution the strife flared 
up again, connected as it was with all the various tactical and practical 
.differences in the socialist movement. Then Lenin took a decisive 
stand against these deviations and, aided by Plechanov, the ablest 
representative of Marxian theory among the Russians, soon succeeded 
in destroying the influence of Machism in the socialist party. 
I n  the Introduction to the German and English editions of Lenin's 
book, Deborin-at that time the official interpreter of Leninism, but 
afterwards disgraced-exalts the importance of the collaboration of 
the two foremost theoretical leaders for the definite victory of true 
Marxism over all anti-marxist, reformist trends. - 
"Lenin's book is not only an important contribution to philosbphy, 
but it is also a remarkable document of an intra-party struggle which 
was of utmost importance in strengthening the general philosophical 
founbtibns of Marxism and Leninism, and which to a great degree 
determined the subsequent growth of philosophical thought amongst 
the Russian Marxists. . . . Unfortunately, matters are different beyond 
the borders of the Soviet Union, . . . where Kantian scholasticism and 
positivistic idealism are in full bloom." 
Since the importance of Lenin's book is so strongly emphasized 
here, it is necessary to make it the subject of a serious critical study. 
The doctrine of Party-Communism of the Third International cannot 
be judged adequately unless their philosophical basis is thoroughly 
examined. 
Marx's studies on society, which for a century now have been 
dominating and shaping the workers' movement in increased measure, 
took thi ir  form from German philosophy. They cannot be understood 
without a study of the spiritual and political developments of the 
European world. Thus it is with other social and philosophical trends 
and with other schools of materialism developing besides Marxism. 
Thus it is, too, with the theoretical ideas underlying the Russian revo- 
lution. Only by comparing these different systems of thought as to 
their social origin and their philosophical contents can we arrive at  
a well-founded judgment. 
The evolution of Marx's ideas into what is now called Marxism 
can be understood only in connection with the social and political 
developments of the period in which they arose. It was the time when 
industrial capitalism made its entry into Germany. This brought 
about a growing opposition to the existing aristocratic absolutism. 
The ascending bourgeois class needed freedom of trade and commerce, 
favorable legislation, a government sympathetic to its interests, free- 
dom of press and assembly, in order to secure its needs and desires 
in an unhampered fight. Instead it  found itself confronted with a 
hostile regime, an omnipotent police, and a press censorship which . 
suppressed every criticism of the reactionary government. The strug- 
gle between these forces, which led to the revolution of 1848, first had 
to be conducted on a theoretical level, as a struggle of ideas and a 
criticism of the prevailing system of ideas. The criticism of the young 
bourgeois intelligentsia was directed mainly against religion and Hege- 
lian philosophy. 
Hegelian philosophy in which the self-development of the " Abso- 
lute Idea" creates the world and then, as developing world, enters 
the consciousness of man, was the philosophical guise suited to the 
Christian world of the epoch of the "Restoration" after 1815. Reli- 
gion handed down by past generations served, as always, as the theo- 
retical basis and justification for the perpetuation of old class rela- 
tions. Since an open political fight was still impossible, the struggle 
against the feudal oligarchy had to be conducted in a veiled form, 
as an attack on religion. This was the task of the group of young 
intellectuals of 1840 among whom Marx grew up and rose to  a leading 
position. 
While still a student Marx admitted, although reluctantly, the 
force of the Hegelian method of thought, dialectics, and made it his 
own. That he chose for his doctor's thesis the comparison of the two 
great materialistic philosophers of ancient Greece, Democritus and 
Epicurus, seems to indicate, however, that in the deep recesses of sub- 
consciousness Marx inclined to materialism. Shortly thereafter he 
was called upon to assume the editorship of a new paper founded by 
the oppositional Rheinish bourgeoisie in Cologne. Here he was drawn 
into the practical problems of the political and social struggle. So 
well did he conduct the fight that after a year of publication the paper 
was banned by the State authorities. It was during this period that 
Fmgi~bch made his final step towards materialism. Feuerbach 
b m h d  sway Hegel's fantastic system, turned towards the simple 
experiences of everyday life, and arrived at the conclusion that reli- 
gion was a man-made produet. Forty years later Engels still spoke 
fervently of the liberating effect that Feuerbach's work had on his 
contemporaries, and of the enthusiasm it aroused in Marx, despite 
critical reservations. To Marx it meant that now instead of attacking 
a heavenly image they had to come to grips with earthly realities. 
Thus in 1843 in his essay "Kritikik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie" 
("A Criticism of the Hegelian Philosophy of Law") he wrote r 
"As far as Germany is concerned the criticism bf religion is pati- 
d l y  completed; and the criticism of religion is the basis of all criti- 
cism. . . . The m a l e  against religion is indirectly the s h g g l e  
against th'at world whose spiritual amma is religion. . . . Religion is 
the moan of the oppressed creature, the sentiment of a heartless 
world, as it is'the spirit of spiritless c o n d i t i ~ .  It is the opium of 
the people. The abolition of religion as the illusory happiness of the 
people is the demand for their real happiness, the demand to abandon 
the illusions about their condition is a demand to abandon a condition 
which requires illusions. The criticism of religion therefore contains 
potmth11y the criticism. of the Vale of Team whose aureole is religion. 
Criticism has plucked the imaginary flowers which adorned the chain, 
not that man shbuld w a r  his fetters denuded of fancifd embellish- 
ment, but that he should throw off the chain and break the living 
flower. . . . Thus the criticism of heaven is transformed into the criti- 
cism of earth, the kriZ;fcism of religion into the criticism of Law, and. 
the criticim of theology into the criticism of pblit ic~.~ 
The task confronting Marx was to investigate the realities of social 
life. In eoIlaboration with- Engels during their stay in Paris and 
Brussels, he made a study of the French Revolution and French social- 
ism, as well as of English economy and the English working-class move- 
ment, which led towards further elaboration of the doctrine known 
as "Historial Materialism". As the theory of social. development by 
way of class struggles we find it expounded in "La midre de la philo- 
sophie" (written in 1846 against Proudhon's "Philosophie de la 
mis6re"), in "The Communist Manifesto" (1848), and in the oft- 
quoted Preface to "Zur Kritik der Politischen Oekonomie" (1859). 
Marx and Engels themselves refer to this system of thought as 
materialism, in opposition to the "idealism" of Hegel and the Young 
Hegelians. What do they understand by materialism 9 Engel, discuss- 
ing afterwards the fundamental theoretical problems of Historical 
Materialism in his "Anti-Duhring" and in his booklet on Feuerbach, 
states in the latter publication: 
"The great basic question' of all philosophy, especially of modem phi- 
losophy, is that concerning the relation of thinking and being. . . . 
Those who asserted the primwy bf the spirit to nature and, therefore, 
in the last instance, assumed world-creation in some form or. other, 
comprised the camp of idealism. The others, who regarded nature as 
primary, belong to the varioua schools of materia1ism." 
That not only the human mind is bound up with the material organ 
of the brain, but that, also, man with his brain and mind is intimately 
connected with the rest of the animal kingdom and the inorganic 
world, was a selfLevident truth to Marx and Engels. This conception 
is common to all "schooIs of materialism." What distinguishes Marxist 
materialism from other schools must be learned from its various 
polemic works dealing with practical questions of politics and society. 
Then we find that to Marx materialistic thought was a working 
method. I t  was meant to explain all phenomena by means of the mate- 
rial world, the existing realities. In his writings he does not deal with 
philosophy, nor does he formulate materialism in a system of philoso- 
phy; he is utilizing it as a method for the study of the world, and 
thus demonstrates its validity. In the essay quoted above, for example, 
Marx does not demolish the Hegelian philosophy of Law by philoso- 
phical disputations, but through an annihilating criticism of the real 
conditions in Germany. 
In the materialist method philosophical sophistry and disputations 
around abstract concepts are replaced by the study of the real world. 
Let us take a few examples to elucidate this point. The statement 
"Man proposes, God disposes" is interpreted by the theologian from 
the point of view of the omnipotence of God. The materialist searches 
for the cause of the discrepancy between expectations and results, 
and finds it in the social effects of commodity exchange and compe- 
tition. The politician debates the desirability of freedom and of social- 
ism ; the materialkt asks : from what individuals or classes do these 
demands spring, what specific content do they have, and to what 
social need to they correspondl The philosopher, in abstract specula- 
tions about the essence of time, seeks to - establish whether or not 
absolute time exiEits. The materialist compares cloeb to see whether 
simultaneousness or succession of two phenomena can be established 
unmistakably. 
Feuerbach had preceded Marx in using the materialist method, 
insofar as he pointed out that religious concepts and ideas are derived 
from material conditions. He saw in living man the source of all 
religious thoughts and concepts. "Der Mensch kt was er isst" (Man 
is what he eats) is a well-known German pun summarizing his doc- 
trine. Whether his materialism would be valid, however, depended 
on whether he would be suceessfd in presenting a clear and convine- 
ing explanation of religion. A materialism that leaves the problem 
obscure is insufficient and will fall back into idealism. Marx pointed 
out that the mere principle of taking living man as the starting point 
is not enough. I n  his theses on Feuerbach in 1845 he formulated the 
essential difference between his materialistic method and Feuerbach 's 
as3 follows : 
"Feuerbach res'olves the religious essence into the human essence 
(das menschliche Wesen). But the human essence is no abstraction 
inherent in each single individual. In its reality it is the ensemble of 
the social relationships" (Thesis 6). "His work consists in the dissolu- 
tion of the religious world into its secular basis. The fact, however, 
that the secular foundation lifts itself above itself and establishes 
itself in the clouds as an independent realm is only to be explained 
by the self-cleavage and self-contradictions of this secular basis. The 
latter itself, therefore, must first be understood in its contradictions, 
and then, by the removal of the contradiction, must be revolutionized 
in practice" (Thesis 4). 
I n  short, man can be understood only ss a social being. From the 
individual we must proceed to society, and then the social contradic- 
tions out of which religion came forth, must be dissolved. The real 
world, the material, sensual world, where all ideology and conscious- 
ness have their origin, is the developing humah society-with nature 
in the background, of course, as the basis on which society rests and 
of which it is a part transformed by man. 
A presentation of these ideas may be found in the manuscript of 
''Die Deutsche Ideologie " (The German Ideology), written in 1845 
but not published. The part that deals with Feuerbach was first pub- 
lished in 1925 by Rjazanov, then chief of the Marx-Engels Institute 
in Moscow; the complete work was not published until 1932. Here 
the theses on Feuerbach are worked out a t  greater length. Although 
it is manifest that Manr wrote it down quite hurriedly, he nevertheless 
gave a brilliant presentation of all the essential ideas concerning the 
evolution of society, which later found their short expression, prac- 
tically, in the proletarian propaganda pamphlet, " The Communist 
-Manifesto7' and, theoretically, in the preface to "Zur Kritik der Poli- 
tischen Oekonomie " (" Critique of Political Economy '7. 
"The German Ideology" is directed first of all against the domin- 
ant theoretical view which regarded consciousnesq as the creator, and 
ideas developing from ideas as the determining factors of human his- 
tory. They are treated here contemptuously as "the phantoms formed 
in the human brain" that are "necessary sublimates of their material, 
empirically verifiable life process bound to material premises." I t  
was essential to put emphasis on the real world, the material and empi- 
rically-given world as the source of all ideology. But it was also neces- 
sary to criticize the materialist theories that culminated in Feuerbach. 
As a protest against ideology, the return to biological man and his 
principal needs is correct; but it is not possible to find a solution to 
the question of how and why religious ideas originate if we take the 
individual as an abstract isolated being. Human society in its histo- 
rical evolution is the dominant reality controlling human life. Only 
out of society can the spiritual life of man. be explained. Feuerbach, 
in his attempt to find an explanation of religion by a return to the 
"real" man did not find the real man, because he searches for him 
in the individual, the human being generally. From his approach the 
world of ideas cannot be explained. Thus he was forced to fall back 
on the ideology of universal human love. "Insofar as Feuerbach is 
a materialist," Marx said, "he does not deal with history, and insofar 
as he considers history, he is not a materialist." 
What Feuerbach could not accomplish was accomplished by the 
Historical Materialism of Marx: an explanation of man's id&s out 
of the material world. A brilliant survey of the historical development 
of society finds its philosophical summary in the sentence : "Men, 
developing their material production and their material intercourse, 
along with this, their real existence, alter their thinking and the pro- 
ducts of their thinking. " Thus, as relation between reality and think- 
ing? materialism is in practice proven to be right. We know reality 
only through the medium of the senses. Philosophy, as theory of 
knowledge, then finds its basis in this principle: the material, empir- 
ically given world is the reality which determines thought. 
The basic problem in the theory of knowledge (epistemology) was 
always: what truth can be attributed to thinking. The term "criti- 
cism of knowledge " ( Erkenntniskritik) used by professional philoso- 
phers for this theory of knowledge, already implies a viewpoint of 
doubt. In his second and fifth theses on Feuerbach Marx refers to 
this problem and again points to the practical activity of man as the 
essential content of his life : 4 
"The question whether objective truth can be attributed to human 
thinking is nbt a question of theory but a practical question. In prac- 
tice man must prove the truth, i.e. the reality and power, the this- 
sidedness of his thinkingn (Thesis 2). "Feuerbach, not satisfied with 
abstract thinking, appeals to sensuous perception ( Anschauung), but 
he does not conceive sensuousness (die Sinnlichkeit) as a practical 
human-sensuous activity" (Thesis 5). 
Why practical l Because man in the first place must live. His 
bodily structure, his faculties and his abilities, and all his activity 
are adapted to this very end. With these he must assert himself in 
the external world, i.e. in nature, and as an individual in society. To 
them abilitieg belongs the activity of the organ of thought, the brain, 
and the facdty of thinking itself. Thinking is a bodily faculty. In 
every phase of life man uses his power of thought to drsw conclnsions 
from his experiences, on which expectations and hopes are built, and 
these conclusions regulate his behavior and his actions. The correct- 
ness of his conclusions, the truth of his thinking, is shown by the very 
fact of his existence, since it is a condition for his survival. Because 
thinking is an efficient adaptation to life, it embodies truth, not for 
every conclusion, but in its general character. On the basis of his 
experiences man derives generalizations and rules, natural laws, on 
which his expectations are based. They are generally correct, as is 
witnessed by his survival. Sometimes, however, false conelusions may 
be drawn, with failure and destruction in their wake. M e  is a con- 
t i n u o ~  process of learning, adaptation, development. Practice is the 
unsparing test of the correitnea~ of thinking. 
Let us first consider this in relation to natural science. In the 
practice of this science, thought finds its purest and most abstract 
form. This is why philosophical scientists take this form as the sub- 
ject of their deductions and pay little attention to its similarity to 
the thinking of everybody in his everyday activity. Yet thinking in 
.the study of nature is only a highly developed special field in the 
entire soc;ial labor process. 'This labor process demands an accurate 
knowledge of natural phenomena and its integration into "laws of 
nature," in order to utili~e them successfully in the field of technics. 
The determination of these laws through observation of special phe- 
nomena is the task of specialists. In the study of nature it is generally 
accepted that practice, experiment, is the test of truth. Here, too, we 
find that the observed regularities, formulated as laws of nature, are 
generally fairly dependable guides to human practice; though they 
are frequently not entirely correct and often balk expectation, they 
ape improved constantly through the progress of science. If, therefore, 
man at times was referred to as the "legislator of nature" it must 
be added that nature often disregards his laws and summons him to 
make better ones. 
The practice of life, however, comprises much more than the scien- 
tific study of nature. The relation of the scientist to the world, despite 
his experiments, remains observational. To him the world is an ex- 
ternal thing to look at. But in reality man deals with nature in his 
practical life by acting upon it and making it part of his existence. 
Man does not stand against nature as to sn external alien world. By 
the toil of his hands man transforms the world, to such an extent that 
the original natural substance is hardly discernible, and in this process 
transforms himself too. Thus man himself builds his new world: 
human society, imbedded in nature transformed into a technical appa- 
ratus. Man is the creator of this world. What meaning, then, has 
the question of whether his thinking embodies truth9 The object of 
his thinking is what he himself produces by his phygical and mental 
activities, and which he controls through his brain. 
: This is not a question of partial tmfhs. Engels in his booklet on 
Feuerbach referred to the synthesking of tlse natural dye alizarin 
(contained in madder) arrc. a proof of the tmth of human thinking. 
This, however, proves only the validity of the chemical formula em- 
ployed; it cannot prove the validity of materialism as-against Kant's 
"Thing-in-itself." This concept, as may be seen from Kant's preface 
to his - "Criticism of Pure Reason, " results from the incapacity of 
bourgeois philosophy to understand the earthly origin of moral law. 
The "Thing-in-itself" is not refuted by chemical industry but by 
Historical Materialism explaining moral l ~ w  through society. It was 
Historical Materialism that enabled Engels to see the fallacy of Kant's 
philosophy, to prove the fallacionwess for which he then offered other 
arguments. Thus, to repeat, it k not a question of partial truths in 
a specific field of knowledge, where the practical outcome affirms 
or refutes them. The point in question is a philosophical one, namely, 
whether human thought is eapa%le of grasping the deepest truth of 
the world. That the philosopher in his secluded study,' who handles 
exclusively abstract philosophical concepts, which are derived in turn 
from ab$tract scientific concepts themselves formulated outside of 
practical life-that he, in the midst of this world of shadows? should 
have his doubts, is easily understood. But for human beings, who live 
and act in the practical every-day world, the question cannot have 
any meaning. The truth of thought, says M a n ,  is nothing but the 
power and mastery over the real world. 
Of course this statement implies its counterpart: thinking cannot 
embody truth where the human mind does not master the world. When 
the products of man's hand-as Marx expounded in "Das Kapita17- 
grow into a power over him, which he no longer controls and which 
in the form of commodity-exchange and capital confronts him as an 
independent social being, mastering man and even threatening to 
destroy him, then his mind submits to the mysticism of supernatural 
beings and he doubts the ability of his thinking to distinguish truth. 
Thus in the course of past centuries the myth of supernatural heavenly 
truth  owa able to man overshadowed the 1118terialistic practice of 
, daily experiences. Not until society has evolved to a state where man 
wil l  be able to comprehend all social forces and will have learned to 
master them-in communist' society, in short-will his thinking en- 
tirely correspond to the world. But already before, when the nature of 
s o d  production as a fundamental basis of life and future develop- 
ment has become clear to man, when the mind-be it only theoretically 
1 
a t  firet-actnally masters the world, our t h i n h g  will be f d y  true. 
That mems that by the science of society as formulated by Marx, 
becsuse now his thesis is fulfilled, materialism gains permanent mas- 
tery and becomes the only conformable philosophy. Thus Marxian 
theory of society in principle means a transformation of philosophy. 
Marx, however, was not concerned with pure philosophy. ' ' Philoso- 
phers have interpreted the world differently, but what matters is to 
change it," he says in his last thesis on Feuerbach. The world situa- 
tion pressed for practical action. . At first inspired by the rieing bour- 
geois opposition to absolutism, then strengthened by the new forces 
that emanated from the struggle of the English and French working 
class against the bourgeoisie, Marx and Engels, through their study 
of social realities, arrived at  the conclusion that theeproletarian revolu- 
tion following on the heels of the bourgois revolution would bring the 
final liberation of mankind. From now onward their activity was 
devoted to this revolution, and in "The Communist Manifesto" they 
laid down the first directions for the workers' class struggle. 
Marxism has since been inseparably connected with the class fight 
of the proletariat. If we ask what Marxism is, we must first of all 
nnderstand that it does not encompass everything Marx ever thought 
and wrote. The views of his earlier years, for instance, such as quoted 
above, are representative only in part; they are phases in a develop- 
ment leading toward Marxism. Neither was it complete a t  once; 
whereas the role-of the proletarian class struggle and the aim of com- 
munism is already outlined in "The Communist ~anifisto,." the theory 
of capitalism and surplus value is developed much later. Moreover, 
Marx's ideas themselves developed with the change of social and poli- 
tical conditions. The character of the revolution and the part played 
by the State in 1848, when the proletariat had only begun to appear, 
differed in aspect from that of later years a t  the end of the century, 
or to-day. Essential, however, are Marx's new contributions to science. 
There is first of all the doctrine of Historical Materialism, the theory 
of the determination of all political and ideological phenomena, of 
spiritual life in general, by the productive forces and relations. The 
system of production, itself based on the state of productive forces, 
determines the development of society, especially through the force 
of the class struggle. There is, furthermore, the presentation of capi- 
talism as a temporary historical phenomenon, the analysis of its struc- 
ture by the theory of value and surplus value, and the explanation 
of . its revolutionary tendencies through the proletarian revolution 
towards communism. With these theories Marx has enriched human 
knowledge permanently. They constitute the solid foundation of 
Marxism as a system of thought. From them further conclusions may 
be drawn under new and changed circumstances. 
1 
Because of this scientific basis, however, Marxism is more than a 
mere science. It is a new way of looking a t  the past and the future, 
a t  the meaning of life, of the world, of thought; it is a spiritual revo- 
lution, it is a new world-view, a new life-system. Bs a system of life 
Marxism is real and living only through the class that adheres to it. 
The workers who are imbued with this new outlook, become aware of 
themselves as the class of the future, wowing in number and strength 
and consoiousness, striving to take production into their own hands, 
and through the revolution to become masters of their own fate. 
Hence Marxism as the theory of proletarian revolution is a reality, 
and a t  the same time a living power, only in the minds and hearts of 
the revolutionary working class. 
Thus Marxism is not an inflexible doctrine or a sterile dogma of 
imposed truths. Society changes, the proletariat grows, science devel- 
ops. New forms and phenomena arise in capitalism, in politics, in 
science, which Marx and Engels could not have foreseen or s d e d .  
Forms of thought and struggle, that under former conditions were 
necessary must under later conditions give way to other ones. But 
the method of research which they framed remaim up to this day an 
excellent guide and tool towards the understanding and interpretation 
of new events. The working class, enormously increased under capi- 
talism, to-day stands only a t  the threshold of its revolution and, hence, 
of its Marxist development; Marxism only now begins to get its full 
significance as a living force in the working class. Thus Marxism 
itself is a living theory which grows with the increase of the proletariat 
and with the tasks and aims of its fight. 
MIDDLE-CLASS MATERIALISM 
Returning now to the political scene out of which Marxism emerged, 
it must be noted that the German revolution of 1848 did not bring 
full political power to the bourgeoisie. But after 1850 capitalism 
developed strongly in France and Germany. I n  Prussia the Progres- 
sive Party began its fight for parliamentarism, whose inner weakness 
became evident later when the government through military actions 
met the demands of the bourgeoisie for a strong national. State. Move- 
ments for national unity dominated the political scene of Central 
Europe. Everywhere, with the exception of England where it already 
held power, the rising bourgeoisie struggled against the feudal abso- 
lutist conditions. 
. The struggle of a new class for power in State and society is at 
tb9 m e  time always a spiritual struggle for a new world view. The 
piwere csn be defeated only when the masses rise up against them 
or, at least, do not follow them any longer. Therefore it was newwary 
for the bourgeoisie to make the working masserr its followers and win 
their adherence to capitaht society. For this purpow the old ideas! 
of the petty bourgeokie and the peasants had to be destroyed and: 
supplanted with new bourgeois ideologies. Capitalism itself furnished 2 
the meam to this end. 
The natural scienkes are .the spiritual basis of capitalism. On t h e 8  
development of thew sciences3 depends the technical progress that " - 
drives capitalism forward. Science, therefore, was. held in high esteem 
by the rising bourgeois clam. At the same time this wience freed them 
from the conventional dogmas embodying the rule- of feudalism. A 
new outlook on life and on the world sprang up out of the scientific 
discoveries, and supplied the bourgeoisie with the necessary argumenh 
to defy the pretensions of the old powers. This new world outlook it 
h e a t e d  among the masses. To the peasant farm and the artisan 
workshop belongq the inherited biblid faith. But as soon as the sons 
of the peasants or the impoverished artisans become industrial workers 
their mind b captured by cspitalist development. Even those who 
remain in pre-capitalistic conditions are lured by the more liberal out- 
look of capitalist prop- and become swceptible to the. propaganda 
of new idam 
The spiritual fikht wes primarily a struggle against religion. The 
religious creed is the ideology of past wnditiom'; it is the inherited 
tradition which keeps the masses in submission to the old powers and 
which had to be defeated. The struggle against religion was imposed 
by the conditions of society; hence it had to take on varying form 
with varying conditions. In those countries where the bourgeoisie had 
already attained full power, as for instance in England, the struggle 
was no longer necessary and the bourgeoisie paid homage to the estab- 
lished church. Only among the lower middle claas and among the 
workers did more radid trends of thought find some adherence. In 
countries where industry &d the bourgeoisie had to fight for emanci- 
pation they proclaimed a liberal, ethical Christianity in opposition to 
the orthodox faith. And where the gtruggle against a still powerful 
royal and aristocratic class waa difficult, and required the utmost 
strength and exertion, the new world view had to assume extreme 
forms of radicalism and gave rim to middle-class materiz$ism. This 
was so to a great extent in Central Europe; so it is natural that most 
of the popular propaganda for materialism (Moleschott, Vogt, Buech- 
ner), originated here, though it found an echo in other countries. In 
addition to these radical pamphleb, a rich literature popularizing the 
modem scientific discoveries appeared, supplying valuable Weapons 
in the struggle to free the msases of the citizens, the workers, and the 
peasants, from the spiritual fetters of tradition, and to turn them 
followers of the progressive bourgeoisie. The middle-class intelli- 
gentsia-professors, engineers, doctore- were the moet zealous propa- 
gandists of the new enlightenment. 
The essence of natural science was the discovery of laws operating 
in nature. A careful study of natural phenomena disclosed recurring 
regularities which allowed for scientific predictions. The 17th cen- 
tury had already known the Galilean law of falling bodies and gra- 
vity, Kepler's laws of the planetary motions, Sneu's law of the refrac- 
tion of light, and Boyle's law of the gas pressure. Towards the end 
of the century came the discovery of the law of gravitation by New- 
ton, which more than all preceding discoveries exerted a tremendous 
influence in the philosophical thought of the 18th and 19th centuries. 
Whereas the others were rules that were not absolutely correct, New- 
ton's law of gravitation proved to be the first real exact law strictly 
dominating the motions of the heavenly bodies, which made possible 
predictions of the phenomena with the same precision with which they 
could be observed. From this the conception developed that all natural 
phenomena follow entirely rigid definite laws. In nature causality 
rules: gravity is the came of bodies falling, gravitation causes the 
movements of the planets. All occurring phenomena are effects totally 
determined by their causes, allowing for neither free will, nor chance 
nor caprice. 
This fixed order of n a m e  disclosed by science was in direct con- 
trast to the traditional religious doctrines in which Ctod as a despotic 
sovereign arbitrarily rules the world and deals out fortune and mis- 
fortune as he sees fit, strikes his enemies with thunderbolts and pestil- 
ence and rewards others with miracles. Miracles are contradictory to 
the fixed order of nature; miracles are impossible, and all reports 
about them in the Bible are fables. The biblical and religious inter- 
pretations of nature belong to an epoch in which primitive agriculture 
prevailed under the overlordship of absolute despots. The natural 
philosophy of the rising bourgeoisie, with its natural laws controlling 
all phenomena, belongs to a new order of state and society where the 
arbitrary rule of the despot is replaced by laws valid for all. 
The natural philosophy of the Bible, which theology asserts to be 
absolute, tlivine, truth is the natural philosophy of ignorance that has 
been deceived by outward appearances, that saw an immovable earth 
. as the centre of the universe, and held that all matter was created and , 
was perishable. Scientific experience showed, on the contrary, that 
matter which apparently disappeared (as for instance in burning) 
actually changes into invisible gaseous forms. Scales demonstrated 
that a reduction of the total weight did not occur in this process and 
that, therefore, no matter disappeared. This discovery was generalized 
into a new principle: matter cannot be destroyed, its quantity always 
remaim? constant, only its forms and combinations change. This holds 
good for each chemical element; its atoms constitute the building 
stones of all bodies. Thus science with its theory of the conservation 
of matter, of the eternity of nature, opposed the theological dogma of 
the creation of the world some 6000 years ago. 
Matter is not the only persistent substance science discovered in 
the transient phenomena. Since the middle of the 19th century the 
law known as the conservation of energy came to be regarded as the 
fundamental axiom of physics. Here, too, a fixed and far reaching 
order of nature was observed; in all phenomena changes of the form 
of energy take place : heat and motion, tension and attraction, electrical 
and chemical energy; but the total quantity never changes. Thia 
principle led to an understanding of the development of cosmic bodies, 
the sun and the earth, in the light of which all the assertions of theo- 
logy appeared like the talk of a stuttering child. . 
Of even greater consequence were the scientific discovekies con- 
cerning man's place in the world. Darwin's theory of the origin of 
species, which showed the evolution of man from the animal kingdom, 
was in complete contradiction to all religions doctrines. But even 
before Darwin, discoveries in biology and chemistry revealed the 
organic identity of all human and living creatures with non-organic 
nature. The protoplasm, the albuminous substance of which the cells 
of all living beings are composed and to which all life is bound, con- 
sists of the same atoms as all other matter. The human mind, which 
was elevated into a part of divinity by the theological doctrine of the 
immortal sod, is closely bound up with the physical properties of the 
brain; all spiritual phenomena are the accompaniment to or the effect 
of material occurrences in the brain cells. 
Middle-class materialism drew the most radical conclusiops from 
these scientific discoveries. Everything spiritual is merely the product 
of material processes; ideas are the secretion of the brain, just as bile 
is the secretion of the liver. Let religion--said Buechner-go on talk- 
ing about the fugacity of matter and the immortality of the mind; 
in reality it is the other way around. With the least injury of the 
brain everything spiritual disappears ; nothing at a11 remains of the 
mind when the brain is destroyed, whereas the matter, its carrier, is 
eternal and indeatmetible. All phenomena of life, including human 
ideas, have their origin in the chemical and physical processes of the 
cellular mbstance ; they differ from non-living matter only in their 
greater complexity. Ultimately all their processes must be explained 
by the dynamics and movements of the atoms. 
These conclusions of natural-science materialism, however, could 
not be upheld to their utmost consequences. After all, ideas are dif- 
ferent from bile and similar bodily secretions; mind cannot be con- 
sidered as a form of force or energy, and belongs in a quite different 
category. If mind is a product of the brain which differs from other 
tissues and cells only in degree of c o m p l ~ t y ,  then, fundamentally, 
it must be concluded that something of mind, some sensation, is to be 
found in every animal cell. And because the cellular substance is only 
an aggregate of atoms, more complex but in substance not different 
from other matter, the conclusion must be that something of what 
we call mind is already present in the atom : in every smallest particle 
of matter there must be a particle of the " spiritual substance. "  his' 
theory of the "atom-soul" we find in the works of the prominent 
zoologist Ernst Haeckel, energetic propagandist of Darwinism and 
courageous combatter of religious dogmatism. Haeckel did not con- 
sider his philosophical views as materialism but called them monism 
--strangely enough since he extends the duality of mind-matter down 
to the smallest elements of the world. 
Materialism could dominate the ideology of the bourgeois class 
only for a short time. Only so long as the bourgeoisie could believe 
that its society of private property, personal liberty, and free compe- 
tition, through the development of industry, science and technique, 
could solve the life problems of all mankind--only so long could the 
bourgeoisie assume that the theoretical problems could be solved by 
science, without the need to assume supernatural and spiritual powers. 
As soon, however, as it became evident that capitalism could not solve 
the life problems of the masses, as was shown by the rise of the prole- 
tarian class stmggle, the confident materialist philosophy disappeared. 
The world was seen again full of insoluble contradictions and uncer- 
tainties, full of sinister forces threatening civilization. So the bour- 
geoisie turned to various kinds of religious creeds, and the bourgeois 
intellectuals and scientists submitted to the influence of mystical tend- 
encies. Before long they were quick to discover the weaknesses and 
shortcomings of materialist philosophy, and to make speeches on the 
"limitations of science" and the insoluble "world-riddles." 
Only a small number of the more radical members of the lower and 
middle classes, who clung to the old political slogans of early capi- 
talipm, continued to hold materialism in respect. Among the working 
class it found a fertile ground. The adherents of anarchism always 
were its most convinced followers. Socialist workers embraced the 
social doctrines of Marx and the materialism of natural science with 
equal interest. The practice of labor under capitalism, their daily 
experience and their awakening understanding of social forces con- 
tributed greatly towards undermining traditional religion. Then, to 
solve their donbte, the need for scientific knowledge grew, and the 
'1~1orbrs beoame the most zealous readers of the works of Buechner 
and HaeckeL Whilst Marxist doctrine determined the practical, poli- 
tied and social. ideology of the workers, a deeper understanding 
asserted itself only gradually ; few became aware of the fact that 
middle-class materialism had long since been outdated and sur- 
passed by Historical Materialism. This, by the way, concurs with the 
fact that the working-class movement had not yet reached beyond 
capitalism, that in practice the class struggle only tended to secure 
its place within capitalist society, a d  that the democratic solutions 
of the early middle-class movements were accepted as valid for the 
working c l m  also. The full comprehension of revolutionary Marxist 
theory is possible only in comection with revolutionary practice. 
Wherein, then, do middle-class materialism and Historical Mate- 
rialism stand opposed to one another! 
Both agree insofar as they are materialist philosophies, that is, 
both recognize the primacy of the experienced material world; both 
recognize that spiritual phenomena, sensation, consciousheaq ideas, 
are derived from the former. They are opposite in that middle-class 
materialism bases itself upon natural science, whereas Historical 
Materialism is primarily the science of society. Bourgeois scientists 
observe msn only as an object of nature, the highest of the animals, 
determined by natural laws. For an explanation of man's life and 
action, they have only general biological laws and, in a wider sense, 
the laws of chemistry, phpics, and mechanics. With these means little 
can be acoomplished in the way of understanding social phenomena 
and ideas. Historical Materialism, on the other hand, lays bare the 
specific evolutionary laws of human society and shows the intercon- 
nection between ideas and society. 
The axiom of materialism that the spiritual is determined by the 
material world, has therefore entirely.different meanings for the two 
doctrines. For middle-class materialism it means that ideas' are pro- 
ducts of the brain, are to be explained out of the structure and the 
changes of the brain substance, 'finally out of the dynamics of the 
atoms of the brain. For Historical Materialism, it means that the 
ideas of man are determined by his social conditions; society is his 
environment which acts upon him through his sense organs. This 
postulates an entirely different kind of problem, a different approach, 
a different line of thought, hence, also a different theory of know- 
ledge. ( 
For middle-class materialism the problem of the meaning of know- 
ledge is a question of the relationship of spiritual phenomena to the 
physico-chemical-biological phenomena of the brain matter. For His- 
torical Materialism it is a question of the relationship of our thoughts 
to the phenomena which we experience as the external world. Now - 
man's position in society is not simply that of an observing being; 
he is a dynamic force whioh reacts upon his environment and changes 
it. Society is nature transformed through labor. To the scientist. 
nature is the objectively given reality which he observes, which acts 
on him through the medium of his senses. To him the external world 
is the active and dynamic element, whilst the mind is the receptive 
element. Thus it is emphasized that the mind is only a reflection, an 
image of the external world, as Engels expressed it. when he pointed 
out the contradiction between the materialist and idealist philosophies. 
But the science of the scientist is only part of the whole of human 
activity, only a means to a greater end. It is the preceding, passive 
part of his activity which i s  followed by the active part: the technical 
elaboration, the 'production, the transformation of the world by man. 
Man is in the first place an active being. In the labor process he 
utilizes his organs and aptitudes in order to constantly build and 
remake his environment. In this procedure he not only invented the 
artificial organs we call tools, but also trained his physical and mental 
aptitudes so that they might react effectively to his natural environ- 
ment as instruments in the preservation of life. His main organ is 
the brain whose function, thinking, is as good a physical activity as 
any other. The most important product of brain activity, of the 
efficient action of the mind upon the world, is science, which stands 
as a mental tool next to the material tools and, itself a productive 
power, constitutes the basis of technology and so an essential part of 
the productive apparatus. 
Hence Historical Materialism looks upon the works of science, the 
conoepts, substances, natural laws, and f ~rces, although formed out 
of the stuff of nature, primarily as the creations of the mental labor 
of man. ~iddle-class' materialism, on the other hand, from the point 
of view of the scientific investigator, sees all this as an element of 
nature itself which has been discovered and brought to light by science. 
Natural scientists consider the immutable substances, matter, energy, 
electricity, gravity, the law of entropy, etc., as the basic elements of 
the world, as the reality that has to be discovered. From the viewpoint 
of Historical Materialism they are products which creative mental 
activity forms out of the substance of natural phenomena. 
This is one fundamental difference in the method of thinking. 
Another difference lies in dialectics which Historical Materialism 
inherited from Hegel. Engels has pointed out that the materialist 
philosophy of the 18th century disregarded evolution; it is evolution 
that makes dialectic thinking indispensable. Evolution and dialectics 
since have often been regarded as synonymous; and the dialectic 
character of Historical 'Materialism is supposed to be rendered by 
saying that it is the theory of evolution. Evolution, however, was 
well known in the natural science of the 19th century. Scientists were 
well acquainted with the growth of the cell into a complex organism, 
with the evolution of animal species as expressed in Darhism, and 
with the theory of evolution of the physical world known as the law 
of entropy. Yet their method of reasoning was nndialectic. They 
believed the concepts they handled to be fixed objects, and considered 
their identities and opposites as absolutes. So the evolution of the 
world as well as the progress of science brought out contradictions, 
of which many examples have been quoted by Engels in his "Anti- 
Diihring. " Understanding in general and science in particular segre- 
gate and systematize into fixed concepts and rigid laws what in the 
real world of phenomena occurs in all degrees of flux and transition. 
Because language separates and defines groups of phenomena by 
means of names, all items falling into a group, as specimens of the 
concept, are considered similar and unchangeable. As abstract con- 
cepts, they differ sharply, whereas in reality they transform and 
merge into one another. The colors blue and green are distinct from 
each other but in the intermediary nuances no one can say where 
one color ends and the other begins. It cannot be stated at what point 
during its life-cycle a flower begins or ceases to be a flower. That 
in practical life good and evil. are not absolute opposites is acknow- 
ledged everyday, just as that extreme justice may become extreme 
injustice. Juridical freedom in capitalist development manifests itself 
as actual slavery. Dialectic thinking is adequate to reality in that 
in handling the concepts it ia aware that the finite cannot fully render 
the infinite, nor the static the dynamic, and that every concept has 
to develop into new concepts, even into its opposite. Metaphysical, 
undialectical thinking, on the other hand, leads $0 dogmatic assertions 
and contradictions because it views conceptions formulated by thought 
as fixed, independent entities that make up the reality of the world. 
Natural science proper, surely, does not suffer much from this 
shortcoming. It surmounts difficulties and contradictions in practice 
insofar as continually i t  revises its formulations, increase their rich- 
ness by going into finer details, improves the qualitative distinctions 
by mathematical formulas, completes them by additions and correc- 
tions, thereby bringing the picture ever closer to the original, the 
world of phenomena. The lack of dialectic reasoning becomes dis- 
turbing only when the scientist passes from his special field of know- 
ledge towards general philosophical reasonings, as is the case with 
middle-class materialism. 
Thus, for instance, the theory of the origin of species often leads 
to the notion that the human mind, having evolved from the animal 
mind, is qualitatively identical with the latter and has only increased 
in quantity. On the other hand, the qualitative difference between 
the human and the animal mind, a fact of common experience, was 
raised by theological doctrine, in enunciating the immortality of the 
soul, into an absolute antithesis. I n  both cases there is a lack of 
dialectic thinking according to which a similarity in original character, 
when through the process of g~owth the increasing quantitative 
difference turns into qualitative difference-the so-called inversion 
of quantity into quality-requires new names and characteristics, 
without leading to complete antithesis and loss of affinity. 
It is the same metaphysical, non-dialectic thinking to compare 
thought, because it is the product of brain processes with such pro- 
ducts of other organs as bile; or to assome that mind, because it is 
a quality of some material substance, must be a characteristic quality 
of all matter. And especially, to think that because mind is something 
other than matter, it must belong to an absolutely and totally dif- 
ferent world without any transition, so that a dualism of mind and 
matter, reaching down to the atoms, remains sharp and unbridgeable. 
To dialectic thinking mind simply is a concept incorporating all those 
phenomena we call spiritual, which, thus, cannot reach beyond their 
actual appearance in the lowest living animals. There the term mind 
becomes questionable, because the spiritual phenomena disappear 
gradually into mere sensibility, into the more simple forms of life. 
"Mind" as a characteristic existing quality, a separate something, 
which either is or is not there, does not exist in nature; mind is just 
a name we attach to a number of definite phenomena, some perceived 
clearly, others uncertainly, as spiritual. 
Life itself offers a close analogy. Proceeding from the smallest 
microscopic organisms to still smaller invisible bacteria and viruses, 
we finally come to highly complicated albuminous molecules that fall 
within the sphere of chemistry. Where in this succession living matter 
ceases to exist and dead matter begins cannot be determined; phen- 
omena change gradually, become simplified, are still .analogous and 
yet already different. This does not mean that we are unable to 
ascertain demarcation lines; it is simply the fact that nature knows 
of no boundaries. A condition or quality "life", which either is or 
is not present, does not exist in nature; again life is a mere name, 
a concept we form in order to comprehend the endless variety of 
gradations in life phenomena. Because middle-class materialism deals 
with life and death, matter and mind, as if they were genuine realities 
existing in themselves, it is compelled to work with hard and sharp 
opposites, whereas nature offers an immense variety of more or less 
gradual transitions. 
Thus the difference between middle-class materialism and Histor- 
ical Materialism reaches down to basic philosophical views. The 
f o m ,  in oontradiction' to the comprehensive and perfectly realistic 
-rid Materialism is illusionary and imperfectjust as the 
b&mgeois class movement, of which it was the theory, represented 
an imperfect and illusionary emancipation, in contrast to the complete 
and reel emancipation by way of the proletarian class struggle. 
The difference between the two systems of thought shows itself 
practically in their position towards religion. Middle-class material- 
ism intended to overcome religion. However, a certain view arisen 
out of social life cannot be vanquished .and destroyed merely by 
refuting it with argumentation; this means posing one point of view 
against another; and every argnment finds a counter-argument. Only 
when it is shown why, and under what circumstances such a view 
was necessary, can it be defeated by establishing the transient char- 
acter of these conditions. Thus the disproof of religion by natural 
science was effective only insofar aa thk primitive religious beliefs 
were concerned, where ignorance about natural laws, about thunder 
and lightning, about matter and energy, led to all kinds of super- 
stition. The theory of bonrgeois society was able to destroy the 
ideologies of primitive agricultural economy. But religion in bour- 
geois society is anehored in its &own and uncontrollable social 
forces; middleclass materialism was unable to deal with them. Only 
the theory of the workers' revolution can destroy the ideologies of 
bourgeois economy. Historid. Materialism explains the social basis 
of religion and shows why for certain times and classes it was a 
necessary way of thought. Only thus was its spell broken. Histor- 
ical Materialism does not fight religion directly; from its higher 
vantage point it understands and explains religion as a natural phen- 
omenon under definite conditions. But through this very insight 
it undermines religion and foresees that with the rise of a new society 
religion will disappear. In  the same way Historical Materialism is 
able to explab the temporary appearance of materialist thought among 
the bourgeoisi.e, as well as the relapae of this class into mysticism 
and religious trends. In the same way, too, it explains the growth 
of materialist thpught among the working class as being not due to 
any antireligious argument but to the growing recognition of the 
real forces in capitalist society. 
DIETZGEN 
Middle-cless materialism, when it came up in Western Europe 
in connection with the fight of the middle class for emancipation, was 
inevitable in practice; but as theory it was a retrogression compared 
*with Historical Mkterialism. Marx and Engels were so far ahead 
that they saw it only as a backsliding into obsolete ideas of the 18th 
century enlightenment. Because they saw so very clearly the weak- 
nesses of the bourgeois political fight in Germany-wbile underrating 
the vitality of the capitalist system-they did not give much atten- 
tion to the accompanying theory. Only occasionally they directed at 
it some contemptuous words, to refute any identification of the two 
kinds of materialism. During their entire lifetime their attention 
was concentrated upon the antithesis of their theory to the idealist 
systems of Geman philosophy, especially Hegel. Middle-class mater- 
ialism, however, wai somewhat more than a mere repetition of 18th 
century ideas; the enormous progress of the science of nature in the 
19th century was its bask and was a source of vigor. A criticism of 
its foundations had to tackle quite different from those of 
post-Hegelian philosophy. What was needed was a critical examina- 
tion of the fundamental ideas and axioms which were universally 
accepted as the resnlts of natural science and which were in part 
accepted by Marx and Engels too. 
Here lies the importance of the writings of Joseph Dietzgen. 
Dietzgen, an artisan, a tanner living in Rhineland, who afterwards 
went to America and there t-ook some part in the working class 
movement, was a self-made socialist philosopher and author. In social 
and economic matters he considered himself a pupil of Marx, whose 
theory of value and capital. he entirely comprehended. In philosophy 
he was an independent original thinker, who set forth the philo- 
sophical consequences of the new world view. Manr and Engels, 
though they honorably mentioned him as "the philosopher of the 
proletariat" did not agree with everything he wrote; they blamed 
his repetitions, often judged him coafused, and it is doubtful whether 
they ever understood the essence of his arguments, far removed from 
their own mode of thinking. Indeed, whereas Marx expresses the 
new truth of his views as precise statements and sharp logical arm- 
ments, Diet~gen sees his chief aim in stimulating his readers to think 
far themselves on the problem of thinking. For this purpose he 
repeats his arguments in many forms, exposes the reverse of what 
he stated before, and assigm to every truth the limits of its truth, 
a dogma. Thus he teaches practical dialectics. Whereas in his later 
1 fearing above all that the reader should accept any statement as , 
writings he is often vague, his first work "The nature of human 
brain work" (1869), and his later "A socialist's excursions into 
the field of epistemology" (1877), as well as some smaller pamphlets, I 
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are brilliant contributions to the theory of knowledge. They form ; 
an essential part in the entirety of the world view that we denote by 
the name of Marxism. The first problem in the science of human 1 
knowledge : the origin of ideas, was answered by Marx in the demon- I 
stration that they are produced by the surrounding world. The second, 1 
adjoining problem, how the impressions of the surrounding world are 
transformed into ideas, was answered by Dietzgen. Marx stated what 
realities determine thought; Dietzgen established the relation be- 
tween reality and thought. Or, in the words of Herman Gorter, Marx 
pointed out what the world does to the mind, Dietzgen pointed out 
what the mind does itself. 
Dietzgen proceeds from the experiences of daily life, and especially 
from the practice of natural science. "Systematization is the essence, 
is the general expression of all activity of science. Science seeks only 
by our understanding to bring the objects of the world into order 
and system." Human mind takes from a group of phenomena what 
is common to them (e.g. from a rose, a cherry, a setting sun their 
color), leaves out their specific diff erences, and fixes their general 
character(red) in a concept; or it expresses as a rule what repeats 
itself (e.g. stones fall to the earth). The object is concrete, the spir- 
itual concept is abstract. "By means of our thinking we have, 
potentially; the world twofold, outside as reality, inside, in our head, 
as thoughts, as ideas, as an image. Our brains do not grasp the things 
themselves but only their concept, their, general image. The endless 
variety of things, the infinite wealth of their characters, finds no 
room in our mind". For our practical life indeed, in order to foresee 
events and make predictions, we do not want all- the special cases 
but only the general rule. The antithesis of mind and matter, of 
thought and reality, of spiritual and material, is the antithesis of 
abstract and concrete, of general and special. 
This, however, is not an absolute antithesis. The entire world, 
the spiritual as well as the visible and tangible world, is object to 
. 
our thinking. Things spiritual do exist, they too are really existing, 
as thoughts; thus they too are materials for our brain activity of 
forming concepts. The spiritual phenomena are assembled in the 
concept of mind. The spiritual and the material phenomena, mind 
and matter together, constitute the entire real world, a coherent 
entity in which, matter determines mind and mind, through human 
activity, determines matter. That we call this total world a unity ' 
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means that each part exists only as a part of the whole, is entirely 
determined by the action of the whole, that, hence, its qualities and 
its special character consists in its relations to the rest of the world. 
Thus also mind, i.e. all things spiritual, is a part of the world's 
totality, and its nature consists in the totality of its relations to the 
world's whole, which we then, as the object of thinking, oppose to it 
under the name material, outer, or real world. If now we call this 
material world primary and the mind dependent, it means for Dietzgen. 
simply that the entirew is primary and the part secondary. Such 
a doctrine where spiritual and material things, entirely interdepen- 
dent, form one united world, may rightly be called monism. 
This distinction between the real world of phenomena and the 
spiritual world of concepts produced by our thinking is especially 
suitable to clear up the nature of scientific conceptions. Physics has 
discovered that the phenomena of light can be explained by rapid 
vibrations propagated through space, or, as the physicists said, through 
space-fiIling ether. Dietzgen quotes a physicist stating that these 
waves are the real nature of light whereas all that we see as light 
and color is only an appearance. "The superstition of philosophical 
speculation here" Dietzgen remarks "has led us astray from the path 
of scientific induction, in that waves rushing through the ether with 
a velocity of 40,000 (German) miles per second, and constituting 
the true nature of light are opposed to the real phenomena of light 
and color. The perversion becomes manifest where the visible world 
is denoted as a product of the human mind, and the ether vibrations, 
disclosed by the intellect of the most acute thinkers, as the corporeal 
reality." It is quite the reverse, Dietzgen says: the colored world 
of phenomena is the real world, and the *ether waves are the picture 
constructed by the human mind out of these phenomena. 
I t  is clear that in this antagonism we have to do with different 
meanings about the terms truth and reality. The only test to decide 
whether our thoughts are truth is always found in experiment, 
practice, experience. The most direct of experiences is experience 
itself; the experienced world of phenomena is the surest of all things, 
the most indubitable reality. Surely we know phenomena that are 
only appearances. This means that the evidences of different senses 
are not in accordance and have to be fitted in a different way in 
order to get a harmonious world-picture. Should we assume the 
image behind the mirror, which we can see but cannot touch, as a 
common reality, then such a confused knowledge would bring practical 
failure. The idea that the entire world of phenomena should be 
nothing but appearance could make sense only if we assumed another - 
source of know1edge-e.g. a divine voice speaking in us-to be brought 
in harmony with the other experiences. 
BLpmg now the same test of practice to the physicist we see 
h t  ,& thinking. is correct also. By means of his vibrating ether 
he not o d y  explained known phenomena but even predicted in the 
right way a number of unsuspected new phenomena. So his theory 
is a good, a true theory. It is truth because it expresses what is 
common to all those experiences in a short fornula that allows of 
easy deduction of their endless diversity. Thus the ether waves must 
be considered a true picture of reality. The ether itself of course 
cannot be observed in m y  way; observation shows only phenomena 
of light; 
How is it then, that the physicists spoke of the ether and its 
vibrations as a reality l Firstly as a model, conceived by analogy. 
From experience we know of waves in water and in the air. If now 
we aeenme such waves in another, finer s u b s ~ c e  filling the universe, 
we may transfer to. it a number of well-known wave-phenomena, and 
we find these confirmed. So we find our world of reality growing 
wider. With our spiritual eyes we see new substances, new particles 
moping, inkisible because they are beyond the power of our best 
microscopes, but conceivable after the model of our visible coarser 
substa&es. and particles. 
In this way, however, with ether as a new invisible reality, the 
physichts landed into difficulties. The analogy was not perfect; 
the world-filling ether had to be assigned qualities entirely different 
from water or air; though called a subtance it deviated so completely 
from an known substances that an Enklkh. physic%& once compared 
it somehow to pitch. When it wa& &overed that light waves were 
electromagnetic vibrations, it ensued that the ether had to t r a d f :  
electric and magnetic phenomena too. For this role, a complicated 
structure had to be devised, a system of moving, straining, and 
spinning oontrivances, that might -be wed as a coarse model, but 
which nobody would call the true reality of thia fin& of fluids 
filling space between the atoms. The thing became worse when in 
the beginning of the 20th century the theory of relativity came up 
and denied the existence of ether altogether. Physicists :then grew 
accustomed to deal with a void spscei, equipped however with qual- 
ities expressed in mathematical formulas and equations. With the 
formulas the phenomena could be computed in the right way; the 
mathematical symbole were the only thing remaining. The models 
and images were nonessential, and the truth of a theory does not 
mean anything more than that the f~rmulas are exwt. 
Things became worse still when phenomena were discovered that 
could be represent,  only by light consisting of a stream of so-called 
quanta, separated particla hurrying through space. At the same 
time the theory of vibrations held the field too, so that according 
to needs one theory or the other had to be applied. Thus two strictly 
contradictory theories both were true, each to be used within its 
p u p  of phenomena. Now at last phpicists began to suspect that 
their physical entities, formerly considered the reality behind the 
phenomena, were only images, abstract concepts, models more easily 
to comprehend the phenomena. When Ditzgen half a century before 
wrote down his views which were simply a consequence of Historical 
Materialism, there was no physicist who did not firmly believe in the 
reality of world ether. The voice of a socialist artisan did not pen- 
etrate into the university lecture rooms. Nowadays it is precisely 
the physicists who assert that they are dealing with models and 
images only, who are continually discussing the philosophical basis 
of their science, and who emphasige that science aims solely at relations 
and formulas through which future phenomena may be predicted 
from former ones. 
In the word phenomenon, "that which appears". there is con- 
tained an oppositeness to the -reality of things ; if we speak of " ap- 
pearings" there must be something else that appears. Not at all, 
says Dietzgen; phenomena appear (or occur), that is all. In this 
play of words we must not think, of course, of what appears to me 
or to another observer; all that happens, whether man sees it or not, 
is a phenomenon, and all these happenings form the totality of the 
world, the real world of phenomena. "Sense perception shows an 
endless transformation of matter. . . . The sensual world, the universe 
at any place and any time is a new thing that did not exist before. 
It arises and passes away, passes and arises under our hands. Nothing 
remains the same, lasting is only perpetual change, and even the 
change varies . . . The (middle-class) materialist, surely, asserts the 
permanency, eternity, indestructibility of matter . . . Where do we 
find such eternal, imperishable formless matter? In the real world 
of phenomena we meet only with forms of perishable matter . . . Eter- 
nal and imperishable matter exists practically, in reality, only as 
the sum total of its perishable phenomena". In  short, matter is an 
abstraction. 
Whereas philosophers spoke of the essence of things, physicists 
spoke of matter, the lasting background behind the changing phen- 
omena. Reality, they say, is matter; the world is the totality of 
matter. This matter consists of atoms, the invariable ultimate build- 
ing stones of the universe, that by their various- combinations impose 
the impression of endless change. On the model of surrounding hard 
objects, as an extension of the visible world of stones, grains, and 
d ~ t ,  these still smaller particles were assumed to be the constituents 
of the entire world, of the fluid water as well as of the formless air. 
The truth of the atomic theory has stood the test of a century of 
experience, in an  endless number of good explanations and successful 
predictio~m. Atoms of course are not observed phenomena themselves ; 
they are inferences of our thinking. As such they share the nature 
of products of our thinking; their sharp limitation and distinction, 
their precise equality belongs to their abstract character. As abstrac- 
tions they express what is general and common in the phenomena, 
what is necessary for predictions. 
To the physicist, of course, atoms were no abstractions but real 
small invisible particles, sharply limited, exactly alike for every 
chemical element, with precise qualities and precise mass. But modern 
science destroyed also this illusion. Atoms, firstly, have been dissolved 
into still smaller particles, electrons, protons, neutrons, forming com- 
plicated systems, some of them inaccessible to any experiment, mere 
products of the application of logic. And these smallest elements of 
the world cannot be considered as precisely defined particles finding 
themselves a t  definite points in space. Modern physical theory assigns 
to each of them the character of a wave motion extending over infinite 
space. When you ask the psysicist what it is that moves in such 
waves his answer consists in pointing to a mathematical equation. 
The waves are no waves of matter, of course; that which moves 
cannot even be called a substance, but is rendered most truly by the 
concept of probability ; the electrons are probability-waves. Formerly 
a particle of matter in its invariable weight presented a precisely 
defined quantity, its mass. Now mass changes with the state of 
motion and cannot be separated accurately from energy; energy and 
mass change into one another. Whereas formerly these concepts 
were neatly separated and the physical world was a clear system 
without contradiction, proudly proclaimed the real world, physics 
nowadays, when it assumes its fundamental concepts matter, mass, 
energy as fixed, well separated entities, is plunged into a crowd of 
unsolvable contradictions. The contradiction is cleared up when we 
simply consider them as what they are : abstractions serviceable , to  
render the ever extending world of phenomena. 
The same holds for the forces and laws of nature. Here Dietzgen's 
expositions are not adequate and somewhat confused, probably be- 
cause a t  the time the German physicists used the word "Kraft" 
indiscriminately for force and for energy. A simple practical case, 
such as gravity, may easily clear up  the matter. Gravity, physicists 
said, is the cause of falling. Here cause is not something preceding 
the effects and different from it ; cause and eff wt are simultaneous 
and express the same thing in  different words. Gravity is a name 
that does not contain anything more than the phenomena themselves ; 
in denoting them by this word we express the general, the common 
character of all the phenomena of falling bodies. More essential 
than the name is the law; in all free movements on earth there is a 
constant downward acceleration. Writing the law as a mathematical 
formula we are able to compute the motions of all fdling or thrown 
bodies. It is not necessary now to keep the phenomena all in our 
head; to know future cases it is sufficient to know the law, the 
formula. The law is the abstract concept our mind constructed out 
of the phenomena. As a law it is a precise statement that is assumed 
to hold good absolutely and universally, whereas the phenomena are 
diversified and always show deviations which we then ascribe to 
other, accessory, causes. 
Newton extended the law of gravity to the celestial motions. The 
orbit of the moon was "explained" by showing that it was pulled 
by the same force that made stones fall onto earth; so the unknown 
was reduced to the known. His law of universal gravitation is ex- 
pressed by a mathematical formula through which astronomers are 
able to compute and predict the celestial phenomena; and the result 
of countless predictions shows the truth of the law. Scientists now 
called the gravitation the "cause" of all these motions; they saw 
it as a reality floating in space, a kind of mysterious imp, a spiritual 
being called a "force" directing the planets in their course; the law 
was a command somehow present in nature which the bodies had to 
obey. In  reality there is nothing of the sort; "cause" means the 
short summary or compendium, "effect" means the diverse multitude 
of phenomena. The formula binding the acceleration of each particle 
to its distance from the other ones, expresses in a short form exactly 
the same course of things as does a lengthy description of the actual 
motions. Gravitation as a separate something pulling and steering 
the bodies does not exist in nature but only in our head. As a mys- 
terious command permeating space it has no more real existence 
than has Snell's law of refraction as a command to the light rays on 
how they have to go. The course of the light rays is a direct mathe- 
matical consequence of the different velocity of light in different 
substances; instead of by the command of a law it can equally well be 
represented by the principle that light, as it were an intelligent being, 
chooses the quickest route to  reach the aim. Modern science, in an 
analogous way, in the theory of relativity, renders the motions in space 
not by gravitational force, but by prescribing the shortest road (the 
"geodesic") in the distorted four-dimensional space-time. Now again 
physicists came to consider this warped space as a "reality" behind 
the phenomena. And again it must be stated that, like Newton's 
gravitation, it is only a mental abstraction, a set of formulas, better 
than the former, hence more true, because it represents more pheno- 
mena which the old law could not explain. 
What is called "causality" in nature, the reign of natural laws 
-+BW&XIW one even speda of the "law of causality, " i.e. in nature 
I & b h ~  ?!t~&asl that laws hold-imply comes down to the fact that the 
&ties we find in the phenomena are expressed in the form of 
grescripts absolutely valid. If there are limitations, exceptions, con- 
ditions, they are expressly stated as such, and we try to- represent 
them by correcting the law; this shows that its character is meant to 
be absolute. We are eohfident that it holds for future me; and if it 
fails, as often happens, or does not hold prechly, we represent this 
by additional "canses." 
.We often speak of the inexorable course of events, or of the neces- 
sity in nature; or we ape& of "determinism," as if this eonrse had 
been determined and fkred by somebody in advame. All these hnman 
names chosen to expmiw the antithesis to the arbitrapinem and free 
choice in hnman actions, denoting a king of compdlsion, are a source 
' 
of much codmion and c~nnot render exactly the character of nature. 
M h e r  we my that the entire nature at this moment. depends entirely 
on what it wae a moment More. Or perhaps better still: that nature 
in its totality and history is a unity, remaining ident idy itself in 
. all its variations. parts are interrdafed es parts of one whole, 
and the lam of nature are the humdy imperfect expressions of these 
interrelations. Nec* can be asmibed to them solely in a partial 
imperfect degrm; absolute neoessity may be affirmed for the entirety 
of nature only. Phenomena may be imperfectly rendered by our 
lam; bat we are oonvinced that they go on in a way which can be 
ultimately redneed to simple dwcription, and could not be otherwise 
than they sre. 
The significance of Marxism is often expressed by saying that it 
presents, for the first time, a natural science of society. Hence society, 
jnst ae natore, is determined by natural laws; society develops hot 
by h c e  or incidentally but acctording to an over-ail necessity. And 
since miety ia hnman activity, then human action Bnd choice and 
will are not mbitmry, not* t'ehanoe, but determined by social causes. 
What this mearm'fl now be clear. The totality of the world, consist- 
ing of nature md society, i s  a unity, at any moment determined by 
what it waa before, eaoh part entirely determined by the action of the 
rest. It r e m a  the same identiaal world, in which the happenings 
of one part, of m d d  or part of it, depend entirely on the surround- 
ing world, natnle snd society together. Here too we try to find re@- 
larities, rules and laws, and we devise names &d concepts; but aeldom 
do we a d b e  to thetn a separate reality. Whereas a phpicist easily 
believes in gravitation as a real something floating in space a m d  
the wn and the planets, it is more difficult to believe in 'cpmgresdp 
or "liberty" hovering round m and floating over society as real 
beings thst conduct man like a ruling fate. They too are abstractions 
constructed by the mind out of partial relations and dependea~i~s. 
With their "necessity" it is 8s with all necessity in nature. Its basis 
is the necessity that man must eat to live. In this popular saying the 
fundamental connection of man with the entirety of the world is 
expressed. 
Through the immense complication of social relations "laws " of 
society are much more difficult to discern, and they cannot now be 
put into the form of exact formulas. Still more than in nature they 
may be said to express not the future but our expectation about the 
future. It is already a great thing that, whereas former thinkers were 
groping in the dark, now some main lines of development have been 
discovered. The importance of Marxism as a science of society is not 
so much the truth of the rules and expectations it formulated, but 
rather what is called its method: the fundamental conviction that 
everything in the world of mankind is directly connected with the 
rest. Hence for every social phenomenon we have to look for the 
material and social factors of reality on which it depends. 
MACH 
In the later part of the 19th century, middle-class society turned 
away more and more from materialism. The bourgeoisie, through 
the development of capitalism, asserted its social mastery; but, the 
rise of the working class movement proclaiming as its aim the annihi- 
lation of capitalism, led to misgivings as to the durability of the 
existing social system. World and future appeared full of unsolvable 
problems. Since the visible, material forces threatened mischief, the 
d i n g  class, to quiet its apprehensions and assure its self-reliance, 
tnrned to the belief in the superior rule of spiritual powers. Mysti- 
cism and religion gained the upper hand, and still more so in the 
20th century, after the first World War. 
Natural scientists form a part of middle-class society; they are in 
continual contact with the bourgeoisie and are influenced by its spiri- 
tual trends. At the same time, through the progress of science, they 
have to deal with new problems and contradictions appearing in their 
concepts. I t  is not clear philosophical insight that inspires the crit- 
icism of their theories, but rather the immediate needs of their praa 
tioal. study of nature. This criticism then takes its form and color 
from the anti-materialist trends in the ruling class. Thus modern 
n a t d  philosophy exhibits two characters: critical reflection over 
the principles of science, and a critical mood towards materialism. 
Just as in the time of Hegel, valuable progress in the theory of know- 
ledge is garbed in mystical and idealistic forms. 
, 
Critics of the prevailing theories came forward, in the last part 
of the 19th century, in different countries: e.g. Karl Pearson in Eng- 
land, Gustav Kirchhoff and Ernst Mach in Germany, Henri Poinear6 
in France, all exhibiting, though in' different ways, the same general 
trend of thought. Among them the writings of Mach have doubtless 
exerted the greatest influence upon the ideas of the next generation. 
Physics, he ssp,  should not proceed from matter, from the atoms, 
from the objects; these are all derived concepts. The only thing we 
know directly is experience, and all experience consists in sensations, 
sense impressions (Empfindungen). By means of our world of con- 
cepts, in consequence of education and intuitive custom, we express 
every sensation as the action of an object upon ourselves as subject: 
I see a stone. But freeing ourselves from this custom we perceive that 
a sensation is a unit in itself, given directly without the distinc'tion 
of subject and object. Through a number of similar sensations I come. 
to the distinction of an object, and I know of myself too only by a 
totality of such sensations. Since object and subject are built up of 
sensations it is better not to use a name that points to a person experi- 
encing them. So we prefer the neutral name of "elements, " as the 
simplest basis of all knowledge. 
Ordinary thinking here finds the paradox that the hard immu- 
table stone, the prototype of the solid "thing" should be formed by, 
should ' ' consist of " such transient subjective stuff as sensations. On 
closer examination, however, we see that what constitutes the thing. 
its qualities, are simply this and nothing else. First its hardness is 
nothing but the totality of + number of often painful sensations; and 
secondly its immutability is the sum total of our experiences that on 
our returning to the same spot the same sensations repeat themselves. 
So we expect them as a fixed interconnection in our sensations. In 
our knowledge of the thing there is nothing that has not somehow the 
character of a sensation. The object is the sum total of all sensations 
at different times that, through a certain constancy of place and sur- 
roundings considered as related, are combined and denoted by a name. 
I t  is no more; there is no reason to assume with Kant a 'thing in 
itself" (Ding an sich) beyond this sensation-mass; we cannot even 
express in words what we would have to think of it. So the object is 
formed entirely by sensations; it conskts merely of sensations. Mach 
opposes his views to the current physical theory by the words: 
"Not bodies produce sensatibns, but element-complexes (sensation- 
complexes) cbnatitute the bodies. When the physicist considers the 
bodies as the permanent reality, the "elements" as the transient 
appearance, he does not realize that all "bodies" are only mental 
symbols for element-complexes (sensation-complexes)" ("Analyse 
der Empfindungen" p. 23). 
The same holds for the subject. What we denote by "I myself" 
& a complex of recollections and feelings, former and present sensa- 
tions and thoughts connected by continuity of memory, bound to a 
special body, but only partly permanent. 
"What is primary is not myself but the elements. . . . The elements 
constitute the myself. . . . The elements of consciousness of one per- 
$on 'are strongly connected, those of different persons are only 
weakly and passingly connected. Hence everybody thinks he knows 
only of himself as an -indivisible and independent unity" ("Adyse  . 
der Empfindungen" p. 19). 
I n  his work "Die Mechanik in ihrer Entwicklnng" (1883) (The 
Development of Mechanics) he writes along the same lines : 
"Nature consists of the elements given by the senses. Primitive man 
first takes out of them certain complexes of these elements that 
present themselves with a certain stability and are most important 
to him. The first and oldest words are names for "things.." Here 
abstraction is made fr'om the surroundings, from the continual small 
'changes of these complexes, which are not heeded because they are 
not important. In nature there is no invariable thing. The thing is 
an abstraction, the name is a symbol for a complex of elements of 
which we neglect the changes. That we denote the entire complex 
by one word, one symbbl, is done because we want to awaken a t  once 
all impressions that belong together. . . , The sensations are no 
"symbols of things." On the contrary the "thing" is a mental symbol 
for a sensation-complex of relative stability. Not the things, the 
bodies, but cblors, sounds, pressures, times (what we usually call 
sensations) are the true elements of the world. The entire process has 
an economical meaning. In picturing facts we begin with the ordi- 
nary more stable and habitual complexes, and afterwards for correc- 
tion add what is unusual" (p. 464). 
I n  this treatment of the historical. development of the science of 
mechanics he. comes close to the method of Historical Materialism. 
To him the history of science is not a sequence of geniuses producing 
marvelous discoveries. He shows how the practical problems are first 
solved by the mental methods of common life, until a t  last they acquire 
their most simple and adequate theoretical expression. Ever again 
the economic function of science is emphasized. 
"The aim of all science is to substitute and to save experiences 
through the picturing and the forecastings bf facts by thoughts, 
because these pictures are more easily a t  hand than the experiences 
themselves and in many respects may stand for them" (p. 452). 
"When we depict facts by thoughts we never imitate them exactly, 
but only figure those siderr that are important for us; we have an 
aim that directly or indirectly arose out of practical interests. Our 
pictures are always abstractions. This again shows an economic 
trendyy (p. 464). 
Here we see science, specialized as well as common knowledge, 
connected with the necessities of life, as an implement of existence. 
"The biolbgical task of science is to offer a most perfect orientation 
to man in the full possession of his senses" ("Analyse der Empfin- 
dungen" p. 29). 
For man, in order to react efficiently to the impressions of his 
surroundings in each situation, it is not necessary to remember dl 
former cases of analogous situations with their results. He has only 
to know what results generally, as a rule, and this determines his 
actions. The rule, the abstract concept is the instrument ready at  
hand that saves the mental consideration of all former cases. What 
natural law states is not what will happen and must happen in nature, 
but what we expect will happen; and that is the very purpose they 
have to serve. 
The formation of abstract concepts, of rules and laws of nature, 
in common life as well as in science, is an intuitive process, intended 
- to save brain work, aiming at economy of thinking. Mach shows in 
a number of examples in the history of science how every progress 
consists in greater economy, in that a larger field of experiences is 
compiled in a shorter way, so that in  the predictions a repetition of 
the same brain operations is avoided. "With the short lifetime of 
man and his limited memory, notable knowledge is only attainable 
by the utmost economy of thinking." So the task-of science consists 
in "representing facts as completely as possible by a minimum of 
brainwork" ("Die Mechanik in ihrer Entwicklung?' p. 461). 
Aceording to Mach the principle of economy of thinking deter- 
mines the character of scientific investigation. What science states 
as properties of things and laws about atoms are in reality relations 
between sensations. The phenomena between which the law of gravi- 
tation establishes relations, consist in a number of visual, auditory 
or tactile impressions; the law says that they occur not by chance, 
and predicts how we may expect them. Of course we cannot express 
the law in this form; it would be inappropriate, unsuitable to practice 
because of its complexity. But as a principle, it is important to state 
that every law of nature deals with relations between phenomena. 
If now contradictions appear in our conceptions about atoms and 
world ether, they lie not in nature but in the forms we choose for our 
abstractions in order to have them available in the most tractable 
way. The contradiction disappears when we express the results of 
our research as relations between observed quantities, ultimately be- 
tween sensations. 
The unconcerned scientific view is easily obscured if a point of 
view fit for a limited aim is made the basis of all considerations. This 
the case, says Mach, "when all experiences are considered as the 
effects of an outer world upon our consciousness. An 'apparently 
inextricable tangle of metaphysical difficulties resdts. The phantom 
disappears directly if we take matters in their mathematical form, and 
make it clear to ourselves that the establishment of functions and rela- 
tions alone avails, and that the mutual dependence of experiences is 
the only thing we wish to know" ("Analyee der Empfindungen" 
p. 28). It might seem B a t  Mach here expresses some doubts about 
the existence of an outer world independent of man. In countleas 
other sentences, however, he speaks in a clear way of mrrounding 
nature in which we have to live and which we have .to investigate. It 
means that such an outer world as is accepted by physics and by ordi- 
nary opinion, the world of matter and forces as producing the pheno- 
mena, leads us into contradictions. The contradictions can be removed 
only if we return to the phenomena and instead of speaking worda 
and abstract terms express our r e d t s  as relations between observe- 
tions. This is what was afterwards called Mach's principle: if we 
ask whether a statement has a meaning and what is its meaning, we 
have to look for what experiments may test it. It has shown its im- 
portance in modern times, first in discussions on time and space in 
the theory of relativity, and then in the understanding of atomic and 
radiation phenomena. Mach's aim was to find a broader field of 
interpretation for physical phenomena. In daily life the solid bodiee 
are most adequate sensation-complexes, and mechanics, the science of 
their motions, was the first well-developed part of physics. But this 
reason does not justify our establishing the form and science of atoms 
es the pattern for the entire world. Instead of explaining heat, light, 
electricity, chemistry, biology, all in terms of such small particles, 
every realm should develop its own adequate concepte. 
Yet there is a certain ambiguity in Mach's expressions on the 
outer world, revealing a manifest propensity towards subjectivism, 
corresponding to the general mystical trend in the capitalist world. 
Especially in later years he liked to discover cognate trends every- 
where, and gave praise to idealistic philosophies that deny the reality 
of matter. Mach did not elaborate his views into a concise coherent 
aptem of philosophy with all consequences well developed. His aim 
wes to give critical thoughts, to stimulate new ideas, often in para- 
doxes sharply pointed against prevailing opinions, without caring 
whether all his statements were mutually consistent and all problems 
solved. Hie was not a philosopher's mind constructing; a system, but 
a scientist's mind, presenting his ideas as a partial contribution to 
the whole, feeling as part of a collectivity of investigators, sure that 
others will. correct his e m r s  and will complete what he left unachieved. 
"The supreme philosophy of a natural scientist" he says elsewhere 
"is to be content with an incomplete world view and to prefer it to 
an apparently complete but unsatisfactory system" ("Die Mechanik 
in ihrer Entwicklung, " p. 437). 
Mach's tendency to emphasize the subjective side of experience 
appears in that the immediately given elements of the world, which we 
. call phenomena, are denoted as sensations. Surely this means a t  the 
same time' a deeper analysis of the phenomena; in the phenomenon 
that a stone f a h  are contained a number of visual sensations com- 
bined with the memory of former visual and spatial sensations. Mach's 
elements, the sensations, may be called the simplest constituents of 
the phenomena. But when he says : "Thus it is true that the world 
consists of our sensations" ("Analyse der Empfindungen" p. 10) 
he means to point to the subjective character of the elements of the 
world. He does not say "my" sensations; solipsism (the doctrine that 
I myself only am existing) is entirely foreign to him and is expressly 
refuted; "I myself" is itself a complex of sensations. But where he 
speaks of fellow-men in relation to the world of sensations, he is not 
entirely clear. 
"Just as little as I consider red and green as belonging to an indi- 
vidqal body, so little I make an essential difference-from this point 
of view of general orientation-between my sensations and another's 
sensatibns. The same elements are mutually connected in many 
"myselfsn as their nodal points. These nodal points, however, are 
nothing perennial, they arise and disappear and change continually" 
( " h l y s e  der Empfindungen" p. 294). 
Here it must bq objected that "red" and "green" as belonging 
to more bodies are not the simple sensational elements of experience, 
but themselves already abstract concepts. It seems that Mach here 
replaces the abstract concepts body and matter by other abstract con- 
cepts, qualities (md colors, that as realities appear in my and in an- 
other's sensations. And when he calls my sensation and another's 
analogous sensation the same element, this word is taken in another 
sense. 
Mach's thesis that the world consists of our sensations, expresses 
the truth that we know of the world only through our sensations; 
they are the materials out of which we build our world; in this sense 
the world, including myself, "consists" of sensations only. At  the 
m e  time, the emphesie upon the subjective character of sensations 
reveals the same middle-class trend of thought that we find in other 
contemporary philosophies. It is even more evident when he points 
out that these views may tend to overcome dualism, this eternal philo- 
sophical antithesis of the two worlds of matter and mind. The phy- 
sical and the psychical world for Mach consist of the same elements, 
only in a different arrangement. The sensation green in seeing a leaf, 
with other sensations is an element of the material leaf; the same sen- 
sation, with others of my body, my eye, my reminiscences, is an 
element of "myself, " of my psyche. 
"Thus I see no antithesis of the physical and the psychical, but I see 
a simple identity relative to these elements. In the sensual realm of 
my consciousness every object is physical and psychioal at the same 
time" ("Analyse der Empfindungen" p. 36). "Not the stuff is dif- 
ferent in both realms, but the tendency of the research" (pag. 14). 
Thus dualism has disappeared; the entire world is a unity, con- 
sisting of the selfsame elements; and these elements are not atom 
but sensations. And in "Erkemtnis und Irrtum" he adds in a foot- 
note 
"There is no difficulty in building up every physical happening out 
of sensations, i.e. psychiml elements; but there is no possibility of 
seeing how out of the usual physical elements, masses and motions, 
any psychical happening might be constructed. . . . We have to con- 
sider that nothing can be object of experience or science that cannbt 
be in some way a part of consciou~ness'~ (p. 12). 
Here, in this footnote added later, in 1905, the well-considered 
equivalence of both worlds, physical and psychical, the careful neu- 
tral characterizing of the elements, is given up by calling them pay- 
chical, and the anti-materialistic spirit of the bourgeoisie breaks 
through. Since it is not our aim to criticize and to contest but only 
to set forth Mach's views we shall not enter into the tautology of the 
last sentence, that only what is in consciousness can be conscious and 
that hence the world is spiritual. 
The new insight that the world is built up out of sensations as 
its elements, meets with difficulties, Mach says, because in our uncri- 
tical youth we took over a world view that had grown intuitively in 
the thousands of years of human development. We may break its 
spell by critically repeating the process through conscious philosophic 
reasoning. Starting with the most simple experiences, the elementary 
sensations, we construct the world step by step: ourselves, the outer 
world, our body as part of the outer world, connected with our own 
feelings, actions and reminiscences. Thus, by analogg, we recognize 
fellow-men as kindred, and so their sensations, disclosed by their say- 
ings, may be used as additional material in constructing the world. 
Here Mach stops; further steps toward an objective world are not 
made. 
That tl&g no accidental incompleteness is shown by the fact 
tbpt WB find the same thing with Carnap, one of the leading thinkers 
in modern philosophy of science. In his work "Der logische Aufbau 
der Welt" (The logical construction of the world) he sets himself the 
same task, but more thoroughly: if we start with knowing nothing, 
having however our full capacity of thinking, how can we establish 
(4'constitute") the world with all its contents l I start with "my 
sensations " and make them inb a system of "sayings " and " objects " 
("object" is the name given to everything about which we may utter 
a saying) ; thus I establish physical and psychical "objects" and con- 
struct "the world" as an ordered system of my sensations. The prob- 
lem of dualism of body and mind, of material and spiritual, finds j 
here the same answer as with Mach : both consist of the same materials, . i 
the sensations, only ordered in a different way. The sensations of 
fellow-men, according to their statements, lead to a phyaical world 
exactly corresponding to mine. So we call it the "intersubjective 
world," common to all subjects; this is the world of natural science. 1 
Here Carnap stops, satisfied that dualism has been removed, and that 
any quest about the reality of the world is now shown to be mefining- 1 
less, because "reality" cannot be tested in another way than by our 1 
experience, our sensations. So the chain of progressive constitutings 
is broken off here. 
It is easy to see the limitedness of this world structure. It is not 
finished. The world thus constituted by Mach and by Carnap is a 
mementary world supposed unchanging. The fact that the world is 
in continuous evolution is disregarded. So we must go on past where 
Carnap stopped. According to our experience people are born and 
die; their sensations arise and disappear, but the world remains. 
When my sensations out of which the world was constituted, cease 
with my death, the world continues to exist. From acknowledged 
scientific facts I know that long ago there was a world without man, 
without any living being. The facts of evolution, founded on our sen- 
sations condensed into science, establish a previous world without any 
mnsations. Thus from an intersubjective world common to all man- 
kind, constituted as a world of phenomena by science, we proceed to 
the constitution of an objective world. Then the entire world view 
changes. Once the objective world is constituted, all phenomena 
become independent of observing man, as relationh between parts of 
the world. The world is the totality of an infinite number of pa* 
acting upon another; every part consists in the totality of its actions 
and reactions with the rest, and all these mutual actions are the phe- 
nomena, the objem of science. Man also is part of the world; we too 
are the totality of our mutual interactions with the rest, the outer * 
world. Our sensations are now seen in a new light; they are the 
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a small part of all happenings in 
nes immediately given to us. When 
out of his sensations, it is a recon- 
ruction in the mind of an already objectively existing world. Again 
have the world twofold, 'with all the problems of epistemology, 
e theory of knowledge. How they may be solved without metaphy- 
is shown by Historical Materialism. 
If one asks why two such prominent philosophers of science omit- 
ted this obvious step toward the constitution of an objective world, 
the answer can only be found in their middle-class world view. Their 
instinctive tenet is anti-materialistic. By adhering to the intersub- 
jective world they have won a monistic world system, the physical 
world consisting of psychical elements, so that materialism is refuted. 
We have here an instructive example how class views determine 
ience and philosophy. 
Summarizing Mach's ideas we distinguish two steps. First the 
nomena are reduced to sensations expressing their subjective char- 
irect reality only in the sensations 
as psychical entities, he does not proceed by precise deductions to an 
objective world that obviously is matter of fact, though in a mystical 
vague way. Then comes a second step from the world of phenomena 
to the physical world. What physics, and by the popular dispersion 
of science also common opinion, assumes as the reality of the world- 
matter, atoms, energy, natural laws, the forms of space and time, 
myself-are all abstractions from groups of phenomena. Mach com- 
bines both steps into one by saying that things are sensation-complexes. 
The second step corresponds to Dietzgen; the similarity here is 
manifest. The differences are accounted for by their different class 
views. Dietzgen stood on the basis of dialectic materialism, and his 
expositions were a direct consequence of Marxism. Mach, borne by 
the incipient reaction of the bourgeoisie, saw his task in a fundamental 
criticism of .physical materialism by asserting dominance to some 
spiritual principle. There is a difference, moreover, in personality 
and aims. Dietzgen was a comprehensive philosopher, eager to find 
out how our brains work; the practice of life and science was to him 
material for the knowledge of knowledge. Mach was a physicist who 
by his criticisms tries to improve the ways in which brains worked in 
scientific investigations. Dietzgen's aim was to give clear insight 
into the role of knowledge in social development, for the use of the 
proletarian struggle. Mach's aim was an amelioration of the practice 
of physical research, for the use of natural science. 
Speaking of practice, Mach expresses himself in different ways. 
At one time he sees no utility in employing the ordinary abstractions: 
"We know only of sensations, and the assumption of those nuclei 
(particles of matter') and their mutual actions as the assigned origins 
of sensations, shows itself entirely futile and superMuous ' ' ( " Analyse 
der Empfindungen" p. 10). Another time he does not wish to dis- 
credit the common view of unsophistica&d "naive realism," because 
it renders great services to mankind in their common life. It has 
grown as a product of nature, whereas every philosophical system is 
an ephemeral product of art, for temporary aims. So we have to see 
"why and to what purposes we usually take one point of view, and 
why and to what purpose we temporarily give it up. No point of 
view holds absolutely; each imports for special aims only, " ( " h a -  
lyse der Empfindungen" P. 30). 
In  the practical application -of his views upon physics Mach met 
with little success. His campaign was chiefly directed against matter 
and atoms dominating physical science. Not simply because they are 
and should be acknowledged as abstractions: "Atoms we can observe 
nowhere, they are as every substance products of thought" ("Die 
Mechanik in ihrer Entwicklung" p. 463). But because they are im- 
practical abstractions. They mean an attempt to reduce all physics 
to mechanics, to the motion of small particles, "and it is easy to see 
that by mechanical hypotheses a real economy of scientific thought 
cannot be achieved" ("Die Mechanik in ihrer EntwicHung" p. 469). 
But his criticism of heat as a form of motion of small particles, already 
in 1873, and of electricity as a streaming fluid, found no echo among 
physicists. On the contrary these explanations developed in ever 
wider applications, and their consequences were confirmed ever again ; 
atomic theory could boast of ever more results and was extended even 
to electricity in the theory of electrons. Hence the generation of phy- 
sicists that followed him, while sympathizing with his general views 
and accepting them, did not follow him in his special applieations. 
Only in the new century, when atomic and electronic theory had pro- 
- gressed in a brilliant display, and when the theory of relativity arose, 
there appeared a host of glaring contradictions in which' Mach's prin- 
. ciples showed themselves the best guides in clearing up the difficul- 
ties. 
AVENARIUS 
The title of henin's work " Materialism and Empiriocriticism " 
imposes the necessity to treat here the Zurich philosopher Richard 
Avenarius, because empiriocriticism was the name he gave to his doc- 
trine, in many parts touching upon Mach's views. I n  his chief work 
' ' Kritik der reinen Erf ahmng' ' (Criticism of pure experience) he 
starts from simple experience, considers carefully what is certain about 
it, and then tests critically what man derived and assumed about the 
world and himself, what is tenable and justifiable in it and what is 
not. 
I n  the natural world view, he explains, I find the following things. 
I find myself with thoughts and feelings within a surrounding world ; 
to these surroundings belong fellow-men acting and speaking as I do, 
whom therefore I assume to be similar to myself. Strictly speaking, 
the interpretation of the movements and sounds connected with fel- 
low-man as having a meaning just as mine is an assumption, not a 
real experience. But it is a necessary wumption without which a 
reasonable world view would be impossible : "the empiriocritical basic 
asmaption of human equality." Then this is my world : first my 
own statements, e.g. "I see (or touch) a tree" (I call this an observa- 
tion) ; I find it, repeatedly, back a t  the same spot, I describe it as an 
object in space; I call it "world," distinct from myself, or "outer 
world." Moreover I have remembrances (I call them ideas), some- 
how analogous to observations. Secondly there are' fellow-men as part 
of the world. Thirdly there are statements of the fellow-men dealing 
with the same world; he speaks to me of the tree he, too, is seeing; 
what he says clearly depends on the "world." So far  all is simple 
and natural, there is nothing more to have thoughts about, nothing of 
inner and outer, of soul and body. 
Now, however, I say: my world is object of the observation of my 
fellow-man; he is the bearer of the observation, it & part of him; I 
put it into him, and so I do with his other experiences, thoughts, feel- 
ings, of which I know through his sayings. I say that he has an "im- 
pression" of the tree, that he makes himself a "conception" of the 
tree. A n  impression, a conception, a sensation of another person, 
however, is imperceptible to me; it finds no place in my world of 
experience. By so doing I introduce something that has a new char- 
acter, that can never be experience to me, that is entirely foreign to 
dl that so far  was present. Thus my fellow-man has now got an  inner 
world of observations, feelings, knowledge, and an outer world that 
he o b ~ r v e ~  and know. Since I stand to him as he stands to me I 
tao have an inner vorld of sensations and feelings opposite to that 
wMt& I call the "outer" world. The tree I saw and know is split into 
a howledge and an object. This process is called "introjection" by 
Avenarius; something k introduced, introjected into man that was 
not present in the original simple empirid world conceptin* . 
Introjeetion has made a -cleavage in the world. It is the philoso- 
phical fd l  of m a .  Before the fall he was in a state of phil~phicetl 
innocence ; he took the world as simple, dngle, as the senses show it ; 
he did not know of body and soul, of mind and matter, of good and 
evil The intmjection brought dualism with all its problems and con- 
tr&o$im. Let ns look at its aomquace;l$ already at the lowest 
&at&- of civilization. On the basis of experienoe introjection takes 
place not only into fellow-man but also into fellow-animal$ into fel- 
low-thin&;sj into trees, roehs, etc: this is animism. We see a man sleep- 
ing; awakened he says he was elsewhere; so part of higl rested here, 
part left the body tempomily. If it does not return, the first part ie 
rotting &way, but the other part appean, in dxeams, g h d y .  80 man 
comists of a perishable body and a non-perishing spirit. $uch spirits 
sleo live in trees, in the sir, in heaven. At a higher stage of aiviliee- 
tion the direct erperienoa of spirits disappears; what ia experienced 
is the outer world of iwnaes; the inner spiritual world is supar-aenwsl. 
"Experience as things and experience ae bowledge now stand agdnrst 
one a ~ t h e r ,  incomparable ss a materid and a spirit& world" ( " ~ r i -  
tik der reinen E r f d q "  g 110). 
In this &ort snmmary of Avenarias' exposure of hk views we 
. olDiitbd one thing that to him is an essential link in the ahsin. To 
the sayings of the fellow-man belone not only himmu and hia body, 
but belongs in particular hia brain. In my experience, Avenarim 
sap, I have three dependenciee: between the sayings of man wd hie 
outer world, behmm his brain and the onter world, and between his 
brain and his tmyhga. The m n d  is a phHd relation, part of the 
law of energy; the other two belong to logic. 
Avenarius now proceede first to ariieise and then to eliminate 
intmjection. Thht actione and sayings of feUow-men are related to 
the outer world i s  my experience. When I intmduee it as ideas into 
him, it is into his brain that I introduce them. But no anatomical 
section can disclose them. "We cannot find any characteristic in the 
thought or in the brain to show that thought is a part or character 
of the brain'? ("ICritilr der reinen Erfahmng" 0 126). Man can 
say truly: I have brain; i.e. to the complex called "myself" brain 
belongs as a part; he can say truly: I have thoughts, i.e. to the complex 
"myself" thoughts belong as a part. But that does not imply that 
my brain have these thoughts. "Thought is thought of myself, but 
not therefore thought of my brain" ("Kritik der reinen Erfahrung 
§ 131). "Brain ieno lodging or site,no producer, no instrument or 
organ, no bearer or substratum, etc., of thinking. . . Thinking is no 
resident or commander, no other side, no product either, not even 
a physiological function of the brain " ("K~itik der reinen Erfah- 
This imposing enumeration of usual psychological statements dis- 
ses why the brain was introduced. To refute our introjection of 
a mental world into fellow-man, Avqnarius emphasizes that its place 
would then be the brain, and 'the brain when anatomically dissected 
does not show it. Elsewhere he says: introjection means that my 
thinking puts itself at the place of fellow-man, hence my thinking 
combines with his brain, which can be done only in fmtasy, not really. 
AB arguments to serve as the basis of a philosophical system they are 
rather artificial and unconvincing. What -is tnie and important is 
the disclosure of the fact of introjection, the demonstration that in 
our assumption that the world of fellow-man is the same kind of thing 
as my own, I introduce a second world of fantasy of another char- 
acter, entirely outside my experience. It corresponds point for point 
with my own; its introduction is necessary; but it means a doubling 
of the world, or rather a multiplication of worlds not directly acces- 
sible to me, no possible part of my world of experience. 
Now Avenarius sees as his tas$ the building up of a world-struc- 
ture free from introjection, by means of the simple data of experience. 
In his exposition he finds it necessary to introduce a special system 
of new names, characters and figures with algebraic expressions to 
designate our ordinary concepts. The laudable intention is this; not 
to be led astray by instinctive associations and meanings connected 
with ordinary language. But the result is an appearance of profound- 
ness with an abstruse terminolow' that nee& to be back-translated 
into our usual terms if we want to understand its meanings, and is 
a source of easy misunderstandings. His argument expressed thus 
by himself in a far more intricate way, may be summarized as follows : 
We find .ourselves, a relative constant, amidet s changing multi- 
tude of units denoted as ' 'trees, ' ' ' ' f ellow-men, " etc., which show many 
mutual relations. "Myself" and "surroundings" are found both at 
the same time in the same experience; we call them "central-part" 
and "counter-part" (Zentralglied und Gegenglied). That my fellow- 
man has thoughts, experiences and a world just as I have, is expressed 
in the statement that part of my surroundings is central-part itself. 
When in his brain variations take place (they belong to my world of 
i experience), then phenomena occur in his world; his sayings about I them are determined by processes in his brains. In my world of experi- 
1 ence the outer world determines the change in his brain (a neurological 
fact) ; not my observed tree determines his observation (situated in 
another world), but the changes caused by the tree in his brain (both 
belonging to my world) determine his observation. Now my scientifia 
experience declares my brain and his brain to change in the same 
way through impressions of the outer world; hence the resulting 
"his world" and my world must be of the same stuff. So the natural 
world-conception is restored without the need of intro jection. The 
argument comes down to this that our practice of assuming similar 
thoughts and conceptions as our own in fellow-men, which should be 
illicit notwithstanding our spiritual intercourse, should become valid 
as soon as we make a detour along the material brains. To which 
must be remarked that neurology may assume as a valid theory that 
the outer world produces the same changes in my brain and in another 
man's; but that, strictly keeping to my experience, I have never 
observed it and never can observe it. 
Avenarius' idea have nothing in common with Dietzgen; they do 
not deal with the connection between knowledge and experience. They 
are cognate to Mach's in that both proceed from experience, dissolve 
the entire world into experience, and believe thus to have done away 
with dualism. , 
"If we keep 'complete experience' free from d l  adulteration, our 
world-conception will be free from d l  metaphysical dualism. To 
these eliminated dualisms belong the abmlute antithesis of 'body' 
and 'mind,' bf 'matter' and 'spirit,' in short of physical and psychical" 
$118). "Things physical, matter in its metaphysical absolute sense 
finds no place in purified 'complete experience,' because 'matter' in 
this conception is only an abstractum, indicating the entirety of 
counter-parts when abstraction is made of all 'central-parts"' 
("Bemerkungen zum Begriff des Gegenstandes der Psychologie" 
5 119). 
This is analogous to Mach ; but it is different from Mach in being 
built out into a finished and closed system. The equality of the experi- 
ence of fellow-man, settled by Mach in a few words, is a most diffi- * 
cult piece of work to Avenarins. The neutral character of the ele- 
ments of experience is pointed out with more precision by Avenarius; 
they are no sensations, nothing psychioal, but simply something 
"found present " (Vorgefundenes) . 
So he opposes prevailing psychology, that formerly dealt with the 
' ' soul, " afterwards with " psychic functions, " because it proceeds 
froln the assumption that the observed world is an image within us. 
This, he says, is not a "thing found present," and neither can it be 
disclosed from what is "found present. " 
"Whereas I leave the tree before me as something seen in the same 
relation to me, as a thing 'found present' to me, prevailing psycholbgy 
puts the tree as 'something seen' into man, especially into his brainm 
("Bemerkungen zum Begriff des Gegenstandes der Psychologiew 
g 45 Note). Introjection created this false object of psychology; it 
changed "before me" into "in me," what is "found present" into what is "imagined;" it made "part of (real) surroundings" intb "part of 
(ideal) thinking." 
For Avenarius, instead, the material changes in the brain are the 
basis of psychology. He proceeds from the thesis taken over from the 
special science of physiology that all action of the surroundings pro- 
duces changes in the brain and that these produce thoughts and say. 
ings-and this certainly lies outside direct experience. It is a curious 
fact that Mach and Carnap too speak of observing (ideally, not real- 
ly) the brain (by physical or chemical methods, or by a "brain-mir- 
ror") to see what happens there in connection with sensations and 
thoughts. It seems that middle-class theory of knowledge cannot do 
without having recourse to this materialist conception. Avenarius is 
the most radical in this respect; for him psychology is the science of 
the dependence of behavior upon the brain; what belongs to the 
actions of man is not psychical but physiological, mere brain pro- 
cesses. When we speak of ideas and ideologies, empiriocriticism speaks 
of changes in the central nervous system. The study of the great 
world-moving ideas in the history of mankind turns into the study of 
their nervous systems. Thus empiriocriticism stands close to middle- 
class materialism that also, in the problem of the determination of 
ideas by the surrounding world, appeals to brain-matter. In compar- 
ing Avenarius with Haeckel we should rather call him Haeckel re- 
versed. Both can understand mind only as an attribute of the brain; 
since mind and matter, however, are fundamentally disparate, Haec- 
kel attributes a particle of mind to every atom, whereas Avenarius 
entirely dispenses with the mind as a special something. But therefore 
the world for him takes instead the somewhat shadowy character- 
frightening to materialists and opening the gate to ideological inter- 
pretations-of consisting of ' 'my experience " only. 
Right as Avenarius may be that it is not strictly experience, the 
equalization of fellow-men with ourselves and the identity of their 
world with ours is an inevitable natural affair, whatever kind of 
spiritual or material terms are used to express it. The point is again 
that middle-class philosophy wants to criticize and correct human 
thinking instead of trying to understand it as a natural process. 
In this context a general remark must be made. The essential 
character in Msch and Avenarius, as in most modern philosophers 
of science, is that they start from personal experience. It is their 
only basis of certainty; to it they go back when asked what is true. 
When fellow-men enter into the play, a kind of theoretical uncer- 
tainty appears, and with difficult reasonings their experience must 
be reduced to ours. We have here an effect of the strong individua 
of the middle-class world. The middle-class individual in his strong 
feeling of personality has lost social consciousness; he does not know 
how entirely he .is a social being. In everything of himself, in his 
body, his mind, his life, his thoughts, his feeling, in his most simple 
experiences he is a product of society; human society made them all 
what they are. What is considered a purely personal sensation: I see 
a tre-an enter into consciousness only through the 'distinctnese 
given to it by names. Without the inherited words to indicate things 
and species, actions and concepts, the sensation could not be expressed 
and conceived. Out of the indistinctive mass of the world of impres- 
sions the important parts come forward only when they are denoted 
by sounds and thus become separated from the unimportant mass. 
When Carnap constructs the world without using the old names, he 
still makes use of his capacity of abstract thinking. Abstract think- 
ing, however, by means of concepts, is not possible without speech; 
speech and abstract thinking developed together as s product of 
society. 
Speech could never have originated without human society for 
which it is an organ of mutual communication. It could develop in 
a society only, as an instrument in the practical activity of man. This 
activity is a social process that as the deepest foundation underlies 
all my experiences. The activity of fellow-man, inclusive his speak- 
ing, I experience as co-natural with my activity because they are parts 
of one common activity; thus we know our similarity. Man is first an 
active being, a worker. To live he must eat, i.e. he must seize and 
assimilate other things; he must search, fight, conquer. This action 
upon the world, a life-necessity, determinm his thinking and feeling, 
because it is his chief life content and forms the most essential pa* 
of his experiences. It was from the first a collective activity, a social 
labor process. Speech originated as part of this collective process, 
as an indispensable mediator in the common work, and at the same 
time as an instrument of reflexive thinking needed in the handling 
of tools, themselves products of collective working. In  such a way 
the entire world of experience of man bears a social character. The 
simple "natural world view" taken by Avenarins and other philoso- 
phers as their starting point, is not the spontaneous view of a primi- 
tive single man but, in philosophical garb, the outcome of a highly 
developed society. 
Social development has, through the increasing division of labor, 
dissected and separated what before was a unit. Scientists and philo- 
sophers have the special task of investigating and reasoning so that 
their science and their conceptions may play their role in the total 
process of produetion-now the role chiefly of supporting and 
~trengthening the existing sociirl system. Cut off from the root of 
life, the social procesa of labor, they hang in the air and have to resort 
to artificial reasonings to find a basis. Thus the philosopher starts 
with ,imagining himself the only being on earth and suspiciotdy aeks 
whether he can demonstrate his own existence; till he is happily re- 
assured by Descartes ''I thing, so I exist. " Then along a chain of logical 
deductions he proceeds to ascertain the existence of the world and of 
fellow-men; and so the self-evident comes out along a wide detour- 
if it comes out. For the middle-class philosopher does not feel the 
necessity to follow up to the last consequences, to materialism, and he 
, 
prefers to stay somewhere in-between, expressing the world in ideolo- 
gical terms. 
So this is the difference: middle-class philosophy looks for the 
source of knowledge in personal meditation, Marxism finds it in social 
labor. All consciousness, all spiritual life of man, even of the most 
lonely hermit, is a collective product, has been made and shaped by 
the working community of mankind. Though in the form of personal 
consciousness-because man is a biological individual-it can exist 
only as part of the whole. People can have experiences only as social 
beings; though the contents are personally different, in their essence 
experiences are super-personal, society being their self-evident basis. 
Thus the objective world of phenomena which logical thought con- 
structs out of the data of experience, is first and foremost, by its 
origin already, collective experience of mankind. 
How Mach's idea could acquire importance in the Russian socialist 
movement, may be understood from social conditions.' The young 
Russian intelligentsia, owing to the barbarous pre-capitalist condi- 
tions, had not yet, as in Western Europe, found its social function in 
the service of a bourgeoisie. So it had to aspire for the downfall of 
Czarism, and to join the socialist party. At the same time it stood in 
spiritual intercourse with the Western intellectuals and so took part 
in the spiritual trends of the Western world. Thus it was inevitable 
that efforts should be made to combine them with Marxism. 
Of course Lenin had to oppose these tendencies. Marxian theory, 
indeed, can gain nothing essential from Mach. Insofar as a better nn- 
derstanding of human thinking is needed for socialists, this can be 
found in Dietzgen's work. Mach was significant because he deduced 
andogous ideas out of the practices of natural science, for the use of 
scientists. In what* he has in common with Dietzgen, the reduction 
of the world to experience, he stopped midway and gave, imbued with 
the anti-materialist trends of his time, a vague idealistic form to his 
views. This could not be grafted upon Marxism. Here Marxist criti- 
cism was needed. 
The Cfiticism 
lienin, however in attacking Mach, from the start presents the 
antagonism in a wrong way. Proceeding from a quotation of Engels, 
he says: 
"But the question here is not of this br &at formulation of material- 
ism, but of the opposition of materialism to idealism, of the differ- 
ence between the two fundamental lines in philosophy. Are we to 
proceed from things to sensation and thbaght? O r  are we to proceed 
from thought and sensation to things? The first line, i.e., the mate- 
rialist line, is adopted by Engels. The second line, i.e., the idealist 
line, is adopted by Machsp (34). (*) 
It is at once clear that this is not the true expression of the anti- 
thesis. According to materialism the material world produces thought, 
consciousness, mind, all things spiritual. That, on the contrary, the 
spiritual produces the material world, is taught by religion, is found 
with Hegel, but is not Mach's opinion. The expression "to proceed 
from . . . to" is used to intermix two quite different meanings. Pro- 
ceeding from things to sensations and thought means: things create 
thoughts. Proceedhg-not from thoughts to things, as lienin wrongly 
imputes to Mach but-from sensations to things, means that only 
through sensations we arrive at the knowledge of things. Their entire 
existence is built up out of sensations; to emphaaiee this truth Mach 
says: they consist of sensations. 
Here the method followed by Lenin in his controversy makes its 
appearance; he tries to assign to Mach opinions different from the 
real ones. Especially the doctrine of solipsism. Thus he continues: 
"No evasions, nb sophisms (a  multitude of which we shall yet encoun- 
ter) can remove the clear and indisputable fact. that Ernst Mach's 
doctrine bf thinge as  complexes of sensations in subjective idealism 
and a simple rehash of Berkeleianism. If bodies are "complexes of 
sensations," as  Mach says or "combinations of sensations," as Ber- 
keley said, it inevitably follows that the whole world is but my idea. 
Starting from such a premise it is impossible to arrive at the exist- 
(*) All numbers in parantheses refer to pages in Lenin's Materialism ( 
and Empirio-Criticism, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1947. 
ence of other people besides oneself: it is the purest solipsism. Much 
as Mach, Avenarius, Petzoldt and the others may abjure solipsism, 
they cannot in fact escape solipsism without falling into howling 
logical absurdities." (34) 
Now, if anything can be asserted beyond any doubt about Mach 
and Avenarius, it is that their opiniom are not solipsism; fellow-men 
similar to myself, deduced with more or less stringent logic, are the 
basis of their world-conception. Lenin, however, manifestly does not 
care about what Mach really thinks, but about what he should think 
if his logic were identical with Lenin's. 
"From which there is only one possible inference, namely, that the 
'world consists only of my sensations.' The word 'our' employed by 
Mach instead of 'my' is employed illegitimately." (36) 
That indeed is an easy way of arguing: what I write down as the 
opinion of my adversary he replaces unjustifiably by what he wrote 
down himself. Lenin, moreover, know8 quite well that Mach speaks 
of the objective reality of the world, and himself gives numerous quo- 
tations to that effect. But he does not let himself be deceived as so 
many others were deceived by Mach. 
"Similarly, even Mach . . . frequently strays into a materialist inter- 
pretation of the word experience . . . (149). Here nature is taken as 
primary and sensati'on and experience as products. Had Mach con- 
sistently adhered to his point of view in the fundamental questions 
of epistemology . . . Mach's special 'philosophy' is here thrown over- 
board, and the author instinctively accepts the customary standpoint 
of the scientists." (150) 
Would it not have been better if he had tried to understand in 
what sense it was that Mach assumes that things consist of sensations? 
The " elements " also are an object of difficulty to Lenin. He sum- 
marizes Mach's opinion on the elements in six theses, among which 
we find, in numbers 3 and 4: 
''Elements are divided into the physical and the psychical; the latter 
is that which depends on the human nerves and the human brganisnd 
generally; the former does not depend on them; the connection of 
physical elements and the connection of psychical elements, it is 
declared, do not exist separately from each other; they exist only 
in conjunction." (47) 
Anybody, even if acquainted only superficially with Mach, can 
see how he is rendered here in an entirely wrong and meaningless way. 
What Mach really says is this: every element, though described in 
many words, is an inseparable unity, which can be part of a complex 
that we call physical, but which combined with different other 
elements can form a complex that we call psychical. When I feel the 
heat of a flame, this sensation together with others on heat and ther- 
mometers and with visible. phenomena combines into the complex 
"flame" or "heat," treated in physics. Combined with other sensa- 
tions of pain and pleasure, with remembrances and with observations 
on nerves, the context belongs to physiology or psychology. "None 
(of these oonnections) is the only existing one, both are present at 
the same time" sap Mach. For they are the same elements in dif- 
ferent combinations. Lenin makes of this that the connections are not 
independent and only exht together. Mach does not separate the 
elements themselves in physical and psychical ones, nor does he dis- 
tinguish a physical and psychicel part in them; the same element is 
physical in one context, psychical in another. If Lenin renders these 
ideas in such a sloppy and unintelligible way it is no wonder that he 
cannot make any sense out of it, and speaks of "an incoherent jumble 
of antithetical philosophical points of view.'? (47) If one does not 
take the pains or is unable to unravel the wl opinions of his adver- 
sary and only snatches up some sentences to interpret them from one's 
own point of View, he should not wonder that nonsense comes out. 
This cannot be called a mandan criticism of Mach. 
In the same faulty way he renders Avenarius. He reproduces a 
small summary by Avenarins of a first division of the elements: what 
' I find present I partly call outer world (e.g. I see a tree), partly not 
(I remember a tree, ththink of a tree). Avenarins denotes them as 
thing-like (sachhaft ) and thought-like (gedankenhaft ) element%. 
Thereupon Lenin indignantly exclaims : 
"At first we are a s s ~ e d  that the 'elements' are sbmething new, both . 
phMcal and psyehical at the same time; then a little correction is 
sarreptitbusly imerted: instead of the crude, materialist differen- 
tiation of matter (bodies, thin@) and the psychical (sensations, recol- 
lections, fmtasiers) we are presented with the doctrine of 'recent 
positivism' regarding elements substantial and elements mental." (50) 
Clearly he does not wapect how completely he misses the point. 
In a chapter superscribed with the ironical title "Does man think 
with his brain 9" Lenin quotes Avenarius' statement that the brain 
is not the lodging, the site, etc. of thinking; thinking is no resident, 
no product, etc. of the brain. Hence: man does not think with his 
brain. Lenin has not perceived that Avenarius further on expresses 
clearly enough, though garbed in his artificial terminology, that the 
action of the outer world upon the brain produces what we call 
thoughts; manifestly Lenin had not the patience to unravel Avena- 
rim' intricate language. But to combat an opponent- you have to 
know hie point; ignorance is no argument. What Avenarius contra- 
dicts is not the role of the brain but that we call the product thought 
when we assign to it, as a spiritual being, a site in the brain and say 
g in the brain, is commanding the brain, or is a function of 
. The material brain, as we saw, occupies precisely the cen- 
osophy. Lenin, however, considers -this only as 
"Avenariu8 here acts on the advice of the charlatan in Turgeniev: 
denounce most of all thbse vices which you yourself possess. Avena- 
rius tries to pretend that he is combatting idealism. . . . While dis- 
tracting the attention of the reader by attacking idealism, Avenarius 
is in fact defending idealism, albeit in slightly different words: 
thought is not s function of the brain; the brain is not the organ of 
thought; sensations are-not 5unctibns of the nervous system, oh, 
no! sensations are-'elements"' (84). 
he critic rages here against a self-mystification without any basis. 
I nds "idealism" in that Avenarius, proceeds from elements, and 
re sensations. Avenarius, however, does not proceed frond 
sensations but from what simple unsophisticated man finds present: 
things, surroundings, a world, fellow-men, remembrances. Man does 
not find present sensations, he finds present a world. Avenarius tries 
to construct a description of the world without the common language 
of matter and mind and its contradictiok. He finds trees present, 
and human brains, and-so he be l i evshanges  in the brains pro- 
duced by the trees, and actions and talk of fellow-men determined by 
these changes. Of all this Lenin manifestly has no inkling. He tries 
to make ' ' idealism " of Avenarius ' system by considering Avenarius ' 
starting point, experience, to be sensations, something psychical, 
materialist view. His error is that he takes the 
tion materialism-idealism in the sense of middle-class 
materialism, with physical matter as its basis. Thus he shuts himself 
off completely from any understanding of modern views that proceed 
ce and phenomena as the given reality. 
Lenin now brings forward an array of witnesses to declare that 
the doctrines of Mach and Avenarius are idealism or solipsism. It' is 
natural that the host of professional philosophers, in compliance with 
the tendency of bourgeois thinking to proclaim the rule of mind over 
matter, try to interpret and emphasize the anti-materialist side of 
their ideas; they too know materialism only as the doctrine of phy- 
sical matter. What, we may ask, is the use of such witnesses? When 
disputed facts have to be ascertained, witnesses are necessary. When, 
however, we deal with the understanding of somebody's opinions and 
theories, we have to read and render carefully what he himself has 
. 
written to expound them; this is the only may to find out similarities 
and differences, truth and error. For Lenin, however, matters were 
different. His book was part of a law-suit, an act of impeachment; 
as such it required an array of witnesses. An important political issue 
was ' at stake ; Machism threatened to corrupt the fundamental doc- 
trines, the theoretical unity of the Party; so its spokesmen had to do 
away with them. Mach and Avenarius formed a danger for the Party ;a 
hence what ~ t t e r e d  was not to find out what was true and valuable 
in their teachings in order to widen our own views. What mattered 
was to discredit them, to destroy their reputation, to reveal them as 
muddle-heads contradicting themselves, speaking confused fudge, 
trying to hide their real opinions and not believing their own aaser- 
tions. 
All the middle-class philosophical writers, standing before the 
newness of these ideas, -look for analogies and relationships of Mach 
and Avenarius with former philosophic systems; one welcomes Mach 
as fitting in with Kant, another sees a likeness to Hume, or Berkeley, 
or Fichte. In this multitude and variety of systems it is easy to find 
out connections and similarities everywhere. Lenin registers all such 
contradictory judgments and in this way demonstrates Mach's con- 
fusion. The like with Avenarius. For instance: 
"And it is difficult to say who more rudely unmasks Avenarius the 
mystifier--Smith by his straightforward and clear refutation, or 
Schuppe by his enthusiastic opinion of Avenarius' crowning work 
The kiss of Wilhelrn Schuppe in philos'ophy is no better than the kiss 
of Peter Struve or Menshikov in politics" (67). 
If we now read Schuppe's "Open Letter to Avenarius, " in which 
in flattering words he expresses his agreement, we find that he did 
not at alI grasp the essence of Avenarius' opinion; he takes the 
"myself" as the starting point instead of the elements found present, 
out of which Avenarius constructs the "myself ". He misrepresents 
Avenarius in the same way as Lenin does, with this difference. that 
+hat displeased Lenin him. In his answer Avenarius, & the 
courteous words usual among scholars, testifies to his satisfaction at 
the assent of such a famous thinker, but then again expounds the real 
contents of his doctrine. henin neglects the contents of these expla- 
nations which refute his conclusions, and quotes only the compromis- 
ing courtesies. 
C 
Natural 8 c i m e  
Over against Mach's ideas Lenin puts the materialistic views, the 
objective reality of the material world, of matter, light-ether, laws 
of nature, such as natural science and human common sense accept. 
These last are two respectable authorities; but in this case their weight 
is not very great. Lenin sneeringly quotes Mach's own confession 
that he found little consent among his colleagues. A critic, however, 
who brings new ideas cannot be refuted by the statement that it is 
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the old criticized ideas that are generally accepted. And as to com- 
mon sense, i.e. the totality of opinions of uninstructed people: they 
usually represent the dicta of science of a former period, that grad- 
ually, by teaching and popular books, seeped down the masses. That 
the earth revolves around the sun, that the world consists of indes- 
tructible matter, that matter consists of atoms, that the world is eternal 
and infinite-all this has gradually penetrated into the minds, 
first of the educated classes, then of the masses. When science proceeds 
to newer and better views, all this old knowledge can, as "common 
me," be brought forward against them. 
How urnspectingly Lenin leans upon these two authorities-and 
en in a wrong way-is seen when he says: 
"For every scientist who has not been led astray by professorial phil- 
osophy, as well as for every materialist, sensation is indeed the direct 
connection between consci'ousness and the external world; it is the 
transformation of the energy of external excitation into a state of 
consciousness. This transformation has been, and is, observed by 
each of us a million times on every hand" (44). 
This "observing" is of the same kind as when one should say: 
see a thousand times that our eye sees and that light falls upon the 
ina. In  reality we do not see our seeing and our retina; we see 
objects and infer the retina and the seeing. We do not observe energy 
and its transitions; we observe phenomena, and out of these pheno- 
mena physicists have abstracted the concept of energy. The transfor- 
mation of energy is a summarized physical expression for the many 
phenomena in which one measured quantity decreased, another in- 
creased. They are all good expedient concepts and inferences, reliable 
in the prediction of future phenomena, and so we call them true. 
Lenin takes this truth in such an absolute way that he thinks he ex- 
presses an observed fact "adopted by every materialist," when he 
pronounces what is actually a physi&l theory. Moreover his exposi- 
tion is wrong. That energy of the light-impression is converted into 
consciousness may have been the belief of middle-class materialists, 
but science does not Bnow of it. Physical science says that energy 
transforms exclusively7 and completely, into other energy; the energy 
of the light-impression is transformed into other forms: chemioal, 
al, heat-energy; but consciousness is not known in physics as 
confounding of the real, observed world and the physical 
permeates Lenin's work on every page. Engels denoted mate- 
rialists as those who considered nature the original thhg. Lenin 
speaks of a "materialism which regards nature, matter, as primary" 
(41). And in another place: "matter is the objective reality given 
to us in sensations" (145). To Lenin nature and physical mat- 
tar sre identical; the name matter has the same meaning as objective 
world. In this he agrees with middle-class materialism that in the 
same way considers matter as the real substance of the world. Thus 
his angry polemics against Mach can be easily understood. To Mach 
matter is an abstract concept formed out of the phenomena--or more 
strictly: sensations. So Lenin, now finding the denial of the reality 
of matter, then reading the simple statement of the reality of the 
world, sees o d y  confusion; and he pretends, now, that Mach is a sol- 
ipsist and denies the existence of the world, and then scornfully 
remarks that Mach throws his own philosophy to the winds and returns 
to scientific views. 
With the laws of nature the case is analogous. Mach's opinion - 
that cause and-effect as well as natural laws do not factually exist in 
nature, but are man-made expressions of observed regularities, is as- 
serted by Lenin to be identical with Kant's doctrine. 
". ..It is man whb dictates laws to nature and not nature that dic- 
tates laws to  man! The important thing is not the repetition of Kant's 
doctrine of apriorism . . . but the fact that reason, mind, conscious- 
ness are here primary, and nature secondary. It is not reason that 
is a part of nature, one of its highest products, the reflectitm of its 
processes, but nature that is a part of reason, which thereby is 
stretched from the ordinary, simple human reason known to us all 
to a 'stupenhua,' as Dietzgen puts it, mysterious, divine reason. The 
fintian-Machian formula, that 'man gives laws to nature,' is a fideist 
fornula" (161). 
This oonfnsed tirade, entirely missing the point, can only be un- 
derstood if we consider that for Lenin "nature" consists not only in 
matter but also in natural laws directing its behimior, floating somehow 
in the world as commanders who must be obeyed by the things. Hence 
to deny the objective existence of these laws means to him the denial 
of nature itself; to make man the creator of natural laws means to 
him to make human mind the creator of the world. How then the 
logical salto is made to the deity as the creator must remain an enigma 
to the -ansophisticated reader. 
Two pages earlier he writes: 
"The really important epistemological question that divides the philo- 
sophical trends is . . . whether the source of our knowledge of these 
connections is objective natural law or properties of our mind, its 
inate faculty bf apprehending certain a priori truths, and so forth. 
This is what s'o irrevocably divides the materialists Feuerbach, Marx 
and Engels from the agnostic (Humeans) Avenarius and Macht' (159). 
That Mach should ascribe to the human mind the power to disclose 
certain aprioristic truths is a new discovery or rather fantasy of 
Lenin. Where Mach deals with the practice of the mind to abstract 
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general rules from experience and to assign to them unlimited validity, 
henin, captivated by traditional philosophical ideas, thinks of disclos- 
ing aprioristic truths. Then he &ntinues : 
- "In certain parts of his works, Mach . . . frequently 'forgets' his 
agreement with Hume and his own subjectivist theory of causality 
and argues 'simply' as a scientist, i.a, from the instinctive material- 
ist standpoint. For instance, in his Mechadc, we read of the 'uni- 
formity . . . which nature teaches us to find in its phenomena' But 
if we do find uniformity in the phenomena of nature, does this mean 
!&hat uniformity exists objectively outside- our mind? No. On the 
question of the uniformity of nature Mach also delivers himself 
thus:. ..'That we consider ourselves capable of making predictions 
. . ;$with the help of such a law only proves that there is sufficient uni- 
lbrmity in our environment, but it does not prove the necessity of 
the success of our predictions' (WErmelehre, S.383). It follows that 
:We may and ought to look for a necessity apart from the d o m i t y  
.L, 4 
of our environment, ie., of nature" (160). 
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;$The embroilment in this tangle of sentences, further embellished 
by courtesies here omitted is undemtandable only when conformity of 
nature is identical for Lenin with the necessity of success of our pro- 
phecies; when, hence, he cannot distinguish between regularities as 
they occur in various degrees of clearness in nature, and the apodietic 
expressi6n of exact natural law. And he proceeds: E- 
r . 
h9'Where to look for it is the secret of idealist philosophy which is 
e man's perceptive faculty as a simple reflection of 
there i s  no necessity, except in our formulation of natural 
. law; and then in practice ever again we find deviations, which, again, 
we express in the form of additional laws. Natural law does not deter- 
mine what nature necessarily will do, but what we expect her to do. 
The silly remark that our mind should simply reflect nature we may 
bave undiacussed now. His concluding remark: 
"In his last work, Erkenntnis und Irrtnm, Mach even defines a law 
D of nature as a 'limitation of expectation' (fZ.Auflage, S.450 ff.)! Sol- ipsism claims its own" (160). 
This lacks all sense since the determination of our expectation by 
natural law is a common affair of all scientists. The embodiment of I a number of phenomena in a short formula, a natural law, is denoted by Mach as "economy of thinking"; he exalts it into a principle of research. We might expect that such a reducing of abstract theory 
to  the practice of (scientific) labor should find sympathy among 
Marxists. In lienin, however, it meets with no response, and he ex- 
poses his lack of understanding in some drolleries: 
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"That it is more 'economical' to 'think' that only I and my sensa- 
tibns exist is unquestionable, provided we want to  introduce such an 
absurd conception info episteomology. Is it 'more economical' to 
'think' of the atom as indivisible, or as composed of positive and nega- 
tive. electrons? Is it 'more economical' to think of the Russian bour- 
geois revolution as  being conducted by the liberals or as being con- 
ducted against the liberals? One has only to put the question in order 
to see the absurdity, the subjectivism of applying the &gory of 
'the economy of thbught' here" (171). 
And he opposes to it his own view: 
"Human thought is 'economical' only when it correctly reflects objec- 
tive truth, and the criterion of this correctness is practice, experi- 
ment and industry. Only by denying objective reality, that is, by 
denying the foundations of Marxism, can one seriously speak bf eco- 
nomy of thought in the theory of knowledge" (171). 
How simple and evident that looks. Let us take an example. The 
old ptolemaic world-system placed the earth as resting in the centre 
of the world, with the sun and the planets revolving around it, the 
latter in epicycles, a combination of two circles. Copernicus placed 
, 
the sun in the centre and had the earth and the planets revolving 
around it in simple circles. The visible phenomena are exactly the ; 
same after both theories, because we can observe the relative motions . 
I 
only, and they are absolutely identical. Which, then, pictures the 
objective world in the right way? Practical experience cannot dis- 4 
tingpish between them; the predictions are identical. Copernicus 
pointed to the fixed stars .which by the parallax could give a decision ; 
but in the old theory we could have the stars making a yearly circle 
just as the planets did; and again both theories give identical results. 
But then everybody will say: it is absurd to have all those thousands 
of bodies describe similar circles, simply to keep the earth a t  rest. 
Why absurd? Because it makes our world-picture needlessly compli- 
cated. Here we have it: the Copernican system is chosen and stated 
to be true because it gives the most simple world system. This example 
may suffice to show the naivite of the idea that we choose a theory 
because after the criterion of experience it pictures reality rightly. 
Kirchhoff has formulated the real character of scientific theory 
in the same way by hie well-known statement that mechanics, instead 
of "explaining" motions by means of the "forces" producing them, 
has the task "to describe the motions in nature in the most complete 
and simple way." Thus the fetishism of forces as causes, as a kind 
of working imps, was removed; they are a short form of description 
only. Mach of course pointed to thewanalogy of Kirchhoff's views 
and his own. Lenin, to show that he does not understand anything 
of it, because he is entirely captivated in this fetishism, calls out in 
an indignant tone : "Economy of thought, " from which Mach in 1872 
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inferred that sensations alone exist . . . is declared to be . . . equiv- 
alent to the simplest description (of an objective reality, the -existence 
of which it never occurred to Kirchhoff to doubt !) " (172). 
It must be remarked, besides, that thinking never can picture 
reality completely; theory is an approximate picture that renders only 
the main features, the general traits of a g m p  of phenomena. 
After having considered lienin's ideas on matter and natnral 
laws, we take as a third instance space and time. 
"Behold now the 'teachings' of 'recent positivism' on this subject. 
We read in Mach: 'Space and time are well ordered (wohlgebrdnete) 
systems of series of sensations" (Mechanik, 3. Auflage, S.498). This 
is palpable idealist nonsense, such as inevitably follows from the 
doctrine that bodies are complexes of sensations. According to Mach, 
it is not man with his sensations that exists in space and time, but 
space and time that exist in man, that depend upbn man and are 
generated by man. He feels that he is falling into idealism, and 
'resists' by making a host of reservations and . . . burying the ques- 
tion under lengthy disquisitions . . . on the mutability of our concep- 
tions of space and time. But this does not save him, and cannot save 
him, for one can really overcbme the idealist position on this question 
only by recognizing the objective reality of space and time. And this 
Mach will not do at  any price. He constructs his epistemological 
theory of time and space on the principle of relativism, and that is 
all. Resisting the idealist conclusions which inevitably foll'ow from 
his premises, Mach argues against Kant and insists that our concep- 
tion of space is derived from experience (Erkenntnis und Irrtum, 2. 
Auflage S. 530, 385). But if objective reality is not given us in ex- 
perience (as Mach teaches) . . ." (179). 
What is the use of going on quoting? It is all r sham battle, be- 
cause we know that Mach assumes the reality of the world; and all 
phenomena, constituting the world, take place in space and time. And 
Lenin could have been warned that he was on a false track, by a 
number of sentences he knows and partly quotes, where Mach dis- 
cusses the mathematical investigations on multi-dimensional spaces. 
There Mach says: "That which we call space is a special real case 
among more general imagined cases . . . The space of vision and touch 
is a threefold manifold, it has three dimensions . . . The properties 
of given space appear directly as objects of experience . . . About the 
given space only experience can teach us whether it is finite, whether 
parallel lines intersect, etc. . . . To many divines who do not know 
where to place hell, and to spiritists, a fourth dimension might be 
very convenient. " But "such a fourth dimension would still remain 
a thing of imagination." These quotations may suffice. What has 
Lenin to say to all this, besides a number of groundless squibs and 
invectives f 
, how does he (Mach) dissociate himself from them in his theory 
of knowledge? By stating that three-dimensional space alone is real! 
But what sort bf defence is it against the theologians and their like 
when you deny objective reality to space and time?" (183). 
What difference might there be between real space and objective 
reality of space? At any rate he sticks to his error. 
What, then, is that sentence of Mach that was the basis of this 
fantasy l In the last chapter of his "Mechanik," Mach discusses the 
relation between different branches of science. There he says : "First 
we perceive that in all experiences on spatial and temporal relations 
we have more confidence, and a more objective and real character is 
ascribed to them, than to experiences on color, heat or sound . . . Yet, 
looking more exactly, we cannot fail to see that sensations on space 
and time are sensations just as those of color, soupd or smell; only, 
in the former we are more trained and clear than in the latter. Space 
and time are well-ordered systems of series of sensations . . .". Mach 
proceeds here from experience; our sensations are the only source 
of knowledge; our entire world, including all we know about space 
and time, is built up out of them. The question of what is the mean- 
ing of absolute space and time is to Mach a meaningless question; 
the only sensible question is how space and time appear in our ex- 
perience. Jnst as with bodies and matter we can form a scientific 
conception of time and space only through abstraction out of the tota- 
lity of our experiences. With -the space-and-time pat ted in which 
we insert these experiences we are versed, as most simple and natural, 
from early youth. How it then appears in experimental science cannot 
be expressed in a better way than by the words of Mach: well-ordered 
sptems of series of experiences. 
What, contrariwise, Lenin thinks of space and time, transpires 
from the following quotation : 
- 
"In modern physics, he says, Newton's idea of absolute time and 
space prevails (pp. 442-44)' of time and space as such. This idea 
seems 'to us' senseless, Mach continues-apparently not suspecting 
the existence of materialists and of a materialist theory of knowledge. 
But in practice, he claims, this view was harmless (un~c~dl ich,  
p. 442) and therefore for a long time escaped criticism', (180). 
Hence, according to Lenin, ' ' materialism " accepts Newton 's doc- 
trine, the basis of which is that there exists an absolute space and an 
absolute time. This means that the place in space is fixed absolutely, 
without regard to other things, and can be ascertained without any 
doubt. When Mach s a p  that this is the point of view of contemporary 
physicikts he surely represents his colleagues as too old-fashioned; in 
his time already it was rather generally accepted that motion and 
rest were relative conceptions, *at the place of a body is always the 
place relative to other bodies, and that the idea of absolute position 
has no sense. 
Still there was a certain doubt whether or not space-filling world- 
ether did not offer a frame for absolute space; motion or rest relative 
to worlbether could be rightly called then absolute motion or rest. 
When, however, physicists tried to determine it by means of the propa- 
gation of light, they could find nothing but relativity. Such was the 
case with Michelson's famous experiment in 1889, arranged in such 
a way that in its result nature should indioate the motion of our earth 
relative to the ether. But nothing was found; nature remained mute. 
It was as if she said: your query has no sense. To explain the nega- 
tive result it was assumed that there always occurred additional pheno- 
mena that just cancelled the expected effect-until Einstein in 1905 
in his theory of relativity combined dl facts in such a way that the 
result was self-evident. Also within the world-occupying ether abso- 
lute position was shown to be B word without meaning. So gradually 
the idea of ether itself wae dropped, and all thought of absolute space 
disappeared from science. 
With time it seemed to be different; a moment in time was as- 
sumed to be absolute. But it was the very ideas of Mach that brought 
about a change here. In  the place of talk of abstract conceptions, 
Einstein introduced the practice of experiment. What are we doing 
when we fix a moment in timet We look at a clock, and we compare 
the different clocks; there is no other way. In  following this lihe of 
argument Einstein succeeded in refuting absolute time and demon- 
strating the relativity of time. Einstein's theory was soon universally 
adopted by scientists, with the exception of some anti-semitic physi- 
cists in Germany who consequently were proclaimed luminaries of 
national-socialist ' ' German ' ' physics. 
The latter development could not yet be known to Lenin when he 
wrote his book. But it illustrates the character of such expositions 
as where he writes: 5 
"The materialist view of space and time has remained 'Harmless,' 
i.e., compatible, as heretofore, with science, while the contmry view 
of Mach and Co, was a 'harmful' capitulation to the position of fide- 
ism'' (183). 
Thus he denotes as materialist theabelief that the concepts of abso- 
lute space and absolute time, which science once wanted as its theory 
but had to drop afterwards, are the true reality of the world. (*) 
Because Mach opposes their reality and asserts for space and time the 
same as for every concept, viz. that we can deduce them only from 
experience, Lenin imputes to him " idealism leading to ' f ideism '. '?  
Materialism 
Our direct concern here is not with Mach but with Lenin. Mach 
occupies considerable space here because Lenin's criticism of Mach 
discloses his own philosophical views. Prom the side of Marxism 
there is enough to criticise in Mach; but Lenin takw up the matter 
from the wrong end. As we have seen he appeals to the old forms of 
physical theory, diffused into popular opinion, so as to oppose them 
against the modern critique of their own foundations. We found, 
moreover, that he identifies the real objective world with physical 
matter, as Aiddle-class materialism did formerly. He tries to demon- 
strate it by the following arguments: 
"If p u  hold that it is given, a philosophical concept is needed for 
this objective reality, a d  this concept has been worked but long, 
long ago. !Ms concept is matter. Matter is a philosophical category 
designating the objective reality which is given to man by his sensa- 
tions, and which is copied, photographed and reflected by bur sensa- 
tions, while existing independently of them" (123). 
Fine; with the first sentence we all can agree. When then, ,how- 
ever, we would restrict the character of reality to physical matter, 
we contradict the first given definition. Electricity too is objective 
reality; is it physical matter? Our sensations show us light; it is 
reality but not matter; and the concepts introduced by the physicists 
t o  explain its phenomena, first the world-ether, then the photons, 
can not easily be denoted as a kind of matter. I s  not energy quite as 
real as is physical matter l More directly than the material things, 
it is their energy that shows itself in all experience and produces our 
(*) These obsolete ideas as an essential part of Leninism QS the Russian 
State-philosophy, were afterwards imposed upbn R u s s h  science, as may 
be inferred from the following communication in Waldemar Kaempf ert 
"Science in Soviet-Russia": "Toward the end of the Trotsky purge, the 
Astronomical Division of the Academy of Sciences passed some impassibned 
resolutions, which were signed by the president and eighteen members and 
which declared that 'modern bourgeois cosmogmy is in a state of deep 
ideological confusibn resulting from its refusal to accept the only true 
dialectic-materialistic concept, namely the infinity of the universe with 
respect to space as well as time,' and a belief in relativity was branded as 
'counter-revo1utionary.t " 
sensations. For that reasono Ostwald, half a century ago, proclaimed 
energy the only real substance of the world; and he called this "the 
end of scientific materialism". And finally, what is given. to us in 
our sensations, when fellow-men speak to us, is not only sound com- 
ing from lips and throat, not only energy of air vibrations, but besides, 
more essentially, their thoughts, their ideas. Man's ideas quite as 
certainly belong to objective reality as the tangible objects; things 
spiritual constitute the real world just as things called material in 
physics. If in our science, needed to direct our activity, we wish to 
render the entire world of experience, the concept of physical matter 
does not suffice ; we need more and other concepts; energy, mind, 
comciousness. 
If according to the above definition matter is taken as the name 
for the philosophical concept. denoting objective reality, it embraces 
far more than physical matter. Then we come to the view repeatedly 
expressed in former chapters, where the material world was spoken 
of as the name for the entire observed reality. This is the meaning 
of the word materia, matter in Historical Materialism, the designa- 
tion of all that is really existing in the world, "including mind and 
fancies," as Dietzgen said. It is not, therefore, that the modern theo- 
ries of the structure of matter provoke criticism of his ideas, as Lenin 
indicates above on the same page, but the fact that he identifies phy- 
sical matter a t  all with the real world. 
The meaning of the word matter in Historical Materialism, as 
pointed out here, is of course entirely foreign to Lenin; contrary to 
his first definition he will restrict it to physical matter. Hence his 
attpck on Dietzgen 's ' ' confusion ' ' : 
-"Thinking is a fundibn of the brain, says Dietzgen. 'My desk as a 
picture in my mind is identical with my idea of it. But my desk out- 
side of my brain is a separate object and distinct from my 'idea.' 
These perfectly clear materialistic propositions are, however, supple- 
mented by Dietzgen thus: 'Nevertheless, the non-sensible idea is also 
sensible, material, i.e., real . . .'. This is obviously false. That both 
thought and matter are 'real,' i.e., exist, is true. But to say that 
thought is material is to make a false step, a step towards confusing 
materialism and idealism. As sr matter of fact this is only an inexact 
expression of Dietzgen" (249). 
Here Lenin repudiates his own definition of matter as the philo- 
sophical expression of objective reality. Or is perhaps objective reality 
something different from really existing? What he tries to express 
-but cannot without " inexactness of expression ' '-is this : that 
thoughts may really exist, but the true genuine reality is only found 
in physical matter. 
Middle-clam materialism, identifying objective reality with ph y- 
aioal matter, had to make every other reality, such as all things spiri- 
tual, an attribute or property of this matter. We cannot wonder, 
therefore, that we find with Lenin similar ideas. To Pearson's sent- 
ence: "It is illogical to aasert that all matter has conscionmess" he 
remarks : 
"It is illogical to assert that all matter is conscious but it is logical 
to assert that all matter possesses a property which is essentially 
akin to sensation, the property of reflectibn" (88). 
And still more distinctly he avers against Mach : 
"As regards materialism, . . . we have already seen in the case of 
Diderot (*) what the real views of the materialists are. These views 
do not consist in deriving sensation from the movement of matter 
or in reducing sensation to the movement 'of matter, but in recogniz- 
ing sensation. as one of the prope*ies of matter in motion. On this 
question Engels shared the standpoint of Diderot" (40). 
Where Engels may have said so, is not indicated. We may doubt 
whether Lehin's conviction that Engels on this point agreed with him 
and Diderot, rests on precise statements. In  his "Anti-Diihring" 
Engels expressed himself in another way: "Life is the form of exist- 
ence of albuminous substances"; i.e. life is not a property of all mat- 
ter but appears only in such complicated molecular structures as 
albumen. So it is not probable that he should have considered sensiti- 
veness, which we know as a property of living matter only, a property 
of all matter. Such generalizations of properties observed only in 
special cases, to matter in general, belong to the mdialectic middle- 
class frame of mind. 
The remark may be inserted here that Plechanov exhibits ideas 
analogous to Lenin's. In his "Grundprobleme des Marxismus" he 
criticizes the botanist Franc& on the subject of the "spirituality of 
matter,'' the "doctrine that matter in general and organic matter 
especially always has a certain sensitivity." Plechanov then expresses 
his own view in the words : " Francs considers this contradictory to 
materialism. In  reality it is the transfer of Feuerbach's materialistic 
doctrine. We may assert with certainty that Marx and Engels would 
have given attention to this trend of thought with the greatest inter- 1 
est." This is a cautious assertion testifying that Marx and Engels 
in their writings never showed any interest i~ this trend of thought. 
> 
1 
(*) Diderot, one of the Encyclbpaedists of the 18th century, had written 
"that the faculty of sensation is a general property of matter, or a product 
of its organization" (Lenin p 29). The wider scope admitted in the latter I 
expression was dropped by Lenin. 
Frand as a limited-minded naturalist knows only the antithesh of 
views in middle-class thinking; he assumes that materialists believe 
in matter only, hence the doctrine that in all matter there is some- 
thing spiritual is, to him, no materialism at all. Plechanov, on the 
other hand, considers it a small modification of materialism that makes 
it more resistant. 
Lenin was quite well aware of the concordance of his views with 
middle-clas*s materialism of the 19th century. For  hi^ "materialism" 
is the common basis of Marxism and middle-class materialism. After 
having expounded that Engels in his booklet on Fenerbach charged 
these materialists with three things,-that they remained with the 
materialist doctrine of the 18th century, that their materialism was 
mechanical, and that in the realm of social science, they held faat to 
idealism and did not understand Historical Materialism-he proceeds : 
"Exclusively for these three things and exclusively within these 
limits, does Engels refute both the materialism of the eighteenth 
century and the doctrines of Biichner and Co.! On all other, more 
elementary, questions of materialism (questions distorted by the 
Machians) there is and- can be no difference between Marx and 
Engels on the one hand and all these bld materialists on the other" 
(246). 
That this is an illmion of Lenin's has been demonstrated in the 
preceeding pages; these three things carry along as their consequences 
an utter difference in the fnhdamental epistemological ideas. And in 
the same way, Lenin continues, Engels was in accordance with Diihr- 
ing in hie materialism: 
"For Engels . . . Diihring was not a sufficiently steadfast, clear and 
cornistent materialist" (247). 
Compare this with the way Engels finished Dtihring off in words 
of scornful contempt. 
Lenh's concordance with middle-class materialimn and his ensu- 
ing discordance with ELis$orical Materialism is manifest in man3 con- 
sequences. The former waged its main war against religion; and the 
chief reproach Lenin raises against Mach and his followers is that 
they sustain fideism. We met with it in several quotations already; 
in h u n h ~ d s  of places all through the book we find fideism as the 
opposite of materialism. Marx and Engels did not know of fideism: 
they drew the line between materialism and idealism. In the name 
fideiem emphasis is laid upon religion. Lenin explains whence he 
took the word. "In France, those who put faith above reason are 
called fideists (from the Latin fides, faith) " (263). 
This oppositeness of religion to reason is a reminiscence from pre- 
marxian times, from the emancipation of the middle-cl-, appealing 
to "reason" in order to attack religions faith as the chief enemy in 
the social struggle ; ' ' free thinking " was opposed to " obscurantism. ' ' 
Lenin, in continually pointing to fideism as the -consequence of the 
contested doctrines indicates that also to him in the world of ideas 
religion is. the chief enemy. 
Thus he scolds Mach for saying that the problem of determinism 
cannot be settled empirically: in research, Mach says, every scientist 
must be determinist but in practical affairs he remains indeterminist. 
"Is this not obscurantism . . . when determinism is confined to the 
field of 'investigation,' while in the field of morality, social activity, 
and all fields other than 'investigation' the question is left to a 'sub- 
jective' estimate" (193). . . . "Apd m things have been amicably di- 
vided: theory for the professors, practice for the theologians!" (194). 
Thus every subject is seen from the point of view of religion. Mani- 
festly it was unknown to Lenin that the deeply religious Calvinism 
was a rigidly deterministic doctrine, whereas the materialist middle- 
class of the 19th century put their faith into free will, henc;! pro- 
claimed indeterminism. At this point a real Marxian thinker would 
not have missed the opportunity of explaining to the Rus&q,Mar?hists 
that it was Historical Materialism that opened the way for determin- 
ism $ the field of society; we have shown above that the theoretical 
conviction that rules and laws hold in a realm-this means determin- 
ism-can find a foundation only when we succeed in establishing 
practically such laws and connections. Further, that Mach because 
he belonged to the middle class end was bound to its fundamental line 
of thought, by necessity was indeterminist in his social views; and 
that in this way his ideas were backward and incompatible with Marx- 
ism. But nothing of the sort is found in Lenin; that ideas are deter- 
mined by class is not mentioned ; the theoretical differences hang in . 
the air. Of course theoretical ideas must be criticized by theoretical 
arguments. When, however, the social consequences are emphasized 
with such vehemence, the social. origins of the contested ideas should 
not have been left out of consideration. This most essential character 
of Marxism does not seem to exist for Lenin. 
So we are not astonished that among former authors it is espe- 
cially Ernest Haeckel who is esteemed and praised by Lenin. In a 
final chapter inscribed "Ernst Haeckel and Ernst Mach" he com- 
pares and opposes them. "Mach . . . betrays science into the hands of 
fideism by virtually deserting to the camp of philosophical idealism" 
(361). But ' ' every page " in Haeckel 's work "is a slap in the face of 
the 'sacred ' teachings of aU official philosophy and theology. ' ' Haeckel 
"instantly, easily and simply revealed . . . that there is a foundation. 
This foundation is natural-scientific materialism" (364). 
I n  his praise it does not disturb him that the writings of Haeckel 
combine, as generally recognized, popular science with a most super- 
f icial philosophy-Lenin himself speaks of his " philosophical naivit8 ' ' 
and says "that he does not enter into an investigation of philosophical 
fundamentals." What i s  essential to him is that Haeckel was a daunt- 
less fighter against prominent religious doctrines. 
"The storm provoked by Ernst Haeckel's "The Riddle of the Uni- 
verse" in every civilized country strikingly brought out, on the one 
hand, the partisan chamcter bf philosophy in modern society and, on 
the other, the true socid significance of the struggle of materialism 
against idealism and agnosticism. The fact that the book was sold 
in hundreds of thousands of copies, that it was immediately trans- 
lated into all languages and that it appeared in special cheap edi- 
tions, clearly demonstrates that the bobk 'has found its way to the 
masses,' that there are numbers of readers whom, Ernst Haeckel at 
once won over to his side. This popular little book became a weapon 
in the class struggle. The professors of philosophy and theology in 
every country of the world set about denouncing and annihilating 
Haeckel in every possible way" (362). 
What class-fight was this? Which class was here represented by 
Haeckel against which other classt Lenin is silent on this point. 
Should his words be taken to imply that Haeckel, unwittingly, acted 
as a spokesman of the working class against the borgeoisie? Then it 
must be remarked that Haeckel was a vehement opponent to socialism, 
and $hat in his defense of Darwinism he tried to recommend it to the 
ruling class by pointing out that it was an aristocratic theory, the 
dpctrine of the selection of the best, most f i t  to refute "the utter non- 
sense of socialist levelling." What Lenin calls a tempest raised by 
the "Weltraetsel" was in reality only a breeze within the middle -class. 
the last episode of its conversion from materialism to idealistic world 
conception. Haeckel's " Weltraetsel" was the last flare up, in a weak- 
ened form, of middle-class materialism, and the idealist, mystic, and 
religious tendencies were so strong already among the bourgeoisie and 
the intellectuals that from all sides they could pounce upon Haeckel's 
book and show up its deficiencies. What was the importance of the 
book for the mass of its readers among the working class we have 
indicated above. When Lenin speaks here of a class fight he demons- 
trates how little he knew of the class fight in countries of developed 
capitalism, and saw it only as a fight for and against religion. 
Plechanov 's Views 
The kinship with middle-class materialism revealed in Lenin's 
book is not simply a personal deviation from Marxism. Analogous 
views are found in Plechanov, a t  the time the acknowledged first and 
prominent theorist of Russian socialism. I n  his book " Grundprobleme 
dag (p"nndmental Problems of Marxism), first written 
in with a Gem- translation in 1910, he begins by broadly 
tm concordance between Marx and Feuerbach. What usually 
is called Feuerbach's Hum-, he explains, meam that Fmerbach 
proceeds from man to matter. "The words of Feuerbach qnoted above 
on the 'human head ' show 4 that the question of 'brain matter ' wes 
answered at the time in a materialist sense. And this point of view 
was also accepted by Marx and Engels. It became the basis of their 
philosophy." -Of course Marx and Engels assumed that human 
thoughts are produced in the brain, just ss they assumed that the 
earth revolved around the sun. Plechanov, however, proceeds : "When ,T 
we deal with this thesis of Feuerbaoh, we get acquainted at the same 
time with the philosophicaZ aide of Marxism." He then quotes the 
sentences of Feuerbach: "Thinking comes from being, but being 
comes not from thinking. Being exists in itself and by itself, existence 
has its basis in itself;" and he cona].udes by adding "Ma= and Engels 
made this opinion on the relation between bqgbg and thinking the 
basis of their materiaht conception of histoe." Surely; but the 
queation is what they mean by "being." In this colorless word many 
opposing concepts of later times are contained undistinguished. All 
that is perceptible to ns we call being; from the side of natural science 
it can mean matter' from the side of social science the esme word can 
mean the entire society. To Peaerbach it was the material substwe 
of m e :  "man is what he eatsv; to Marx it is social reality? i.e. a 
aociety of people, tools, production-relations, that determines con- 
mioixmeas. 
Plechanov then speaks of the first of Marx's theses oh Feuerbach; 
he says that Marx here "cadopletes and deepens Feuerbach's ideas" ; 
he explains that Feue rhh  took man in his pawive relations, Ma= in 
his active relation to nature. He points to the later statement in ' ' Das 
Kapital": ''Whilet maa works upon outside nature and changes it, 
he changes at the same time 6is own nature," and he adds: "The 
profundity of this thought becomes clear in the light of Marx'a theory 
of knowledge. . . . It must be admitted, though, that Marx's theory of 
knowledge is a direct offspring af Feuerbach's or, more rightly, rep- 
resents Feuerbach's theory of knowledge which, then, has been deep- 
ened by Manc in a masterly way." And again, on the next page, he 
speaks of "modern materialimn, the materialism of Feuerbach, Marx 
and Engels." What must be admitted, rather, is that the ambiguous 
sentence: being determines thought, is common to them, and that the 
materialist doctrine that brain produces thought is the most messen- 
tial part of Marxism and contains no trm yet of a real theory of 
knowledge. 
The essential side of Marxism is what distinguished it from other 
materialist theories and what makes them the expression of different 
class struggles. Feuerbach's theory of knowledge, belonging to the 
fight for emancipation of the middle class, has its basis in the lack of 
science of soieew as the most powerful reality determining human 
thinking. llhwxian theory of knowledge proceeds from the action of 
society, this self-made material world of man, upon the mind, and 
so belongs to the proletarian class struggle. Certainly Marx's theory 
of knowledge descended, historically, from Hegel and Feuerbach ; but 
equally certainly it grew into something entirely different from Hegel 
and Feuerbach. It is a significant indication of the point of view of 
Plechanov that he does not see this antagonism and that he assigns 
the main importance to the trivial community of opinion-which is 
unimportant for the real issue-that thoughts are produced by the 
brain. 
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION 
The concordance of Lenin and Plechanov in their basic philoso- 
phical views and their common divergence from M d m  points to 
their common origin out of the Russian social conditions. The name 
and garb of a doctrine or theory depend on its spiritual degent; they 
indicate the earlier thinker to whom we feel most indebted and whom 
we think we follow. The real content, however, depends on its mate- 
rial origin and is determined by the social conditions under which it 
developed and has to work. Marxism itself says that the main social 
ideas and spiritual trends express the aims of the classes, i.e. the needs 
of social development, and change with the class struggles themselves. 
So they cannot be understood isolated from society and class struggle. 
This holds for Marxism itself. 
In  their early days Marx and Engels stood in the first ranks of 
the middle-class opposition, not yet disjoined into its different social 
trends, against absolutism in Germany. Their development towards 
Historical Materialism, then, was the theoretical reflex of the develop- 
ment of the working class towards independent action against the 
bourgeoisie. The practical class-antagonism found its expression in 
the theoretical antagonism. The fight of the bourgeoisie against feudal 
dominance was expressed by middle-class materialism, cognate to 
Fenerbach 's doctrine, which used natural science to fight religion as 
the consecration of the old powers. The working class in its own fight 
has little use for natural science, the instrument of its foe; its theore- 
tical weapon is social science, the science of social development. To 
fight religion by means of natural science has no significance for the 
workers; they know, moreover, that its roots will be cut off anyhow 
first by capitalist development, then by their own class struggle. 
Neither have they any use for the obvious fact that thoughts are pro- 
duced by the brain. They have to understand how ideas are produced 
by society. This is the content of Marxism, as it grows among the 
workers as a living and stirring power, as the theory expressing their 
growing power of organization and knowledge. When in the second 
half of the 19th century capitalism gained complete mastery in West- 
ern and Central Europe as well as in America, middle-class material- 
ism disappeared. Marxism was the only materialist class-view re- 
maining. 
I n  Russia, however, matters were different. Here the fight against 
Czarism was analogous to the former fight against absolutism in 
Europe. I n  Russia too church and religion were the strongest sup- 
ports of the system of government ; they held the rural masses, engaged 
in primitive agrarian production, in complete ignorance and super- 
stition. The struggle pgainst religion was here a prime social neces- 
sity. Since in Russia there was no significant bourgeoisie that as a 
future ruling class could take u p  the fight, the task fell to the intel- 
ligentsia; during scores of years it waged a strenuous fight for en- 
lightenment of the masses against Czarism. Among the Western 
bourgeoisie, now reactionary and anti-materialist, it could find no 
support whatever in this struggle. It had to appeal to the socialist 
workers, who alone sympathized with it, and. it took over their acknow- 
ledged theory, Marxism. Thus it came about that even intellectuals 
who were spokesmen of the first rudiments of a Russian bourgeoisie, 
such as Peter ~ t r u v e  and Tugan Baranovski, presented themselves as 
Marxists. They had nothing in common with the proletarian Marxism 
of the West; what they learned from Marx was the doctrine of social 
development with capitalism the next phase. A power for revolu- 
tion came up in Russia for the first time when the workers took up 
the fight, first by strikes only, then in  combination with political 
demands. Now the intellectuals found a revolutionary class to join 
up  with, in order to  become its spokesmen in a socialist party. 
Thus the proletarian class struggle in Russia was a t  the sanie time 
a struggle against Czarist absolutism, under the banner of socialism. 
So Marxism in Russia, developing as the theory of those engaged in 
the social conflict, necessarily assumed another character than in 
Western Europe. It was still the theory of a fighting working clam; 
but this class had to fight first and foremost for what in Western 
Europe had been the function and work of the bourgeoisie, with the 
intellectuals as its associates. So the Russian intellectuals, in adapt- 
ing the theory to this local task, had to find a form of Marxism in 
which criticism of religion stood in the forefront. They found it in 
an approach to earlier forms of materialism, and in the first writings 
of Marx from the time when in Germany the fight of the bourgeoisie 
and the workers against absolutism was still undivided. 
This appears most clearly in Pleehanov, the "father of Russian 
Marxism." At the time that in Western countries theorists occupied 
themselves with political problems, he turned his attention to the older 
materialists. In his ' ' Beitrage m r  Qeschichte des Materialismus ? 
(Contributions to the History of Materialism) he treats the French 
materialists of the 18th century, Helvetius, Lamettrie, and compares 
them with Marx, to show how many valuable irnd important ideas 
were already contained in their works. Hence we understand why in 
his ' ' Grundprobleme des Marxismus " he stresses the concordance 
between Marx and Feuerbach and emphasizes the view points of mid- 
dle-class materialism. 
Yet Plechanov was strongly influenced by the Western, especially 
the German workers', movement. He was known as the herald of the 
Russian working-class struggle, which he predicted theoretically at 
a time when practically there was hardly any trace. He was esteemed 
as one of the very few who occupied themselves with philosophy; he 
played an international role and took part in the discussions on Marx- 
ism and reformism. Western socialists studied his writings without 
perceiving a t  the time the differences hidden within them. Thus he 
was determined by Russian conditions less exclusively than Lenin. 
Lenin was the practical leader of the Russian revolutionary move- 
ment. Hence in his theoretical ideas its practical conditions and poli- 
tical aims are shown more clearly. The conditions of the fight against 
Czarism determined the basic views exposed in his book. Theoretical, 
especially philosophic views are not determined by abstract studies 
and chance reading in philosophical literature, but by the great life- 
taski which, imposed by the needs of practical activity, direct the 
will and thought of man. To Lenin and the Bolshevist party the first 
life-task was the annihilation of Czarism and of the backward barba- 
rous social system of Russia. Church and religion were the theoretical 
foundations of that system, the ideology and glorification of absolu- 
tism, expression and symbol of the slavery of the masses. Hence a 
relentless fight against them was needed ; the struggle against religion 
stood in the center of Lenin's theoretical thought; any concession 
however small to "fideism" was an attack on the life-nerve of the 
movement. As a fight against absolutism, landed property, and clergy, 
the fight in Russia was very similar to the former fight of bourgeoisie 
and intellectuals in Western Europe; so the thoughts and funda- 
mental ideas of Lenin must be similar to what had been propagated 
in middle-class materialism, and his sympathies went to its spokesmen. 
In Rnssia, however, it was the working class who had to wage the 
. fight; so the fighting organization had to be a socialist party, pro- 
claiming Marxism as its creed, and taking from Marxism what was 
necessary for the Russian Revolution : the doctrine of social develop- 
ment from capitalism to socialism, and the doctrine of class war as 
its moving force. Hence Lenin gave to his materialism the name and 
garb of Marxism, and assumed it to be the real-i.e. peculiarly work- 
ing-class as contrasted with middle-class-Marxism. 
This identification was supported by - still another circumstance. 
In  Russia capitalism had not grown up gradually from small-scale 
production in the-hands of a middle class, as it had in Western 
Europe. Big industry was imported from outside as a foreign element 
by Western capitalism exploiting the Russian workers. Moreover 
Western financial capital, by its loans to Czarism, exploited the entire 
agrarian Russian people, who were heavily taxed to pay the interests. 
Western capital here assumed the character of colonial capital, with 
the Cear and his officials as its agents. In corntries exploited as colo- 
nies all the classes have a common interest in throwing off the yoke 
of the R ~ O U S  foreign capital, to establish their own free economic 
development, leading ss a rule to home capitidism. This fight is 
waged against world-capital, hence often under the name of socialism; 
and the workers of the Western countries, who stand against the same 
foe, are the natural allies. Thus in China Sun-Pat-Sen was a socialist ; 
since, however, the Chinese bourgeoisie whose spokedman he was, was 
a numerous and powerful class, his s o c i a b  was "national" and he 
opposed the ''errors2 ' of M a d m .  
Lenin, on the contrary, had to rely on the working class, and be- 
came his fight bad to be implacable and radical, he espoused the most 
radical ideology of the Western proretariiat fkhting world-capitalism, 
viz, Marxism. Since, however, the Russian revolution showed a mix- 
ture of two characters, midd].eolass revolution in its immediate aims, 
proletarian revolution in its active forces, the appropriate bolshevist 
theory too had to present two characters, middle-class materialism in 
its basic philosophy, proletarian evolutionism in its doctrine of class 
fight. This mixture was termed Marxism. But it is clear that Lenins 
Marxism, as d e t e d e d  by the special Russian attitude toward capit- 
alism, must be fundamentally different from the real Marxism grow- 
ing as their basic view in the workers of the countries of big capital- 
ism. Marxism in Western Europe & the world view of a working class 
confronting the task of converting s most highly developed capital- 
ism, its own world of life and action, into communism. The Russian 
workers and intellectuaIs could not make this' their object; they had 
first to open the way for a free development of a modern industrial 
society (*). To the Rntssian marxists the nucleus of Marxism is not 
contained in' M8nc's the& that social reality determines conscious- 
ness, but in the sentence of young Marx, inscribed in big letters in 
the Moscow People's House, that religion is the opium of the people. 
It may happen that in a theoretical work there appear not the 
immediate surroundings and tasks of the author, but more general 
and remote influences and wider tasks. In Lenin's book, however, 
nothing of the sort ie perceptible. It is .a manifest and exclusive 
reflection of the Russian Revolution at which he was aiming. Its 
character so entirely corresponds to middle-class materialism that, if 
it had been known at the time in Western Europe-but only confused 
rumors on the internal strifes of Russian socialism penetrated here- 
and if it could have been rightly interpreted, one could have predicted 
that the Russian revolution must somehow result in a kind of capital- 
ism based on a workers' struggle. 
There is a widespread op&n that the bolshevist party was marx- 
kt, and that it was only for practical reasons that Lenin, the great 
scholar and leader of Marxism, gave to the revolution another direc- 
tion than what Western workers called commdsm-thereby showing 
hie realistic marxian insight. The critical opposition to the Russian 
and C.P. politics tries indeed to oppose the despotic practice of the 
present Bnssian government-termed Stalinism-to the ' ' true " Marx- 
ist principles of Lenin and old Bolshevism. Yrongly so. Not only 
beoanse in practice these politics were inaugurated already by Lenin. 
But also because the alleged Marxism of Lenin and the bolshevist 
par@ is nothing but a legend. Lenin never knew red Marxism. 
Whence ahodd he have taken it? Capitalism he knew only as colonial 
cspitalism; social revolution he knew only as the annihilation of big 
land ownership and Czarist despotism. Russian bolshevism cannot be 
reproached for having abandoned the way of Marxism; for it was 
never on that way. Every page of Lenin's philosophical work is there 
to prove it; and Marxism itself, by its thesis that theoretical opinions 
are determined by social relations and necessities, makes clear that it 
could not be otherwise. Marxism, however, at the same time shows 
the necessity of the legend; every middle-class revolution, requiring 
working class and peasant support, needs the illusion that it is some- 
thing different, larger, more universal. Here it was the illusion that 
(*) Bolshevist historians, since they. knew capitalism only in the char- 
scter of colonial capitalism, were keen in recognizing the pole of colonial 
capital in the mrld, and wer6 able to write excellent studies on it. But at 
the same time they readily overlooked its difference from home capitalism. 
mus  Prokrovski in his "History of Russia" represents 1917 as the end of 
a Russian capitalist development bf many centuries. 
the Russian revolution was the first step of world revolution liberat- 
ing the entire proletarian class from capitalism; its theqretical ex- 
pression was the legend of Marxism. 
Of course Lenin was a pupil of Marx; from Marx he had learnt 
what was most essential for the Russian revolution, the uncompromis- 
ing proletarian claas struggle. Just as for analogous reasons, the 
social-democrats were pupils of &rx. And surely the fight of the 
Russian workers, in their mass actions and their soviets, was the most 
important practical example of modern proletarian warfare. That, 
however, Lenin did not understand Marxism as the theory of prole- 
tarian revolution, that he did not understand capitalism, bourgeoisie, 
proletariat in their highest modern development, was shown strikingly 
when from Russia, by means of the Third International, the world 
revolution was to be started, and the advice and warnings of Western 
Marxists were entirely disregarded. An unbroken series of blunders, 
failures, and defeats, of which the present weakness of the workers' 
movement was the result, showed the unavoidable shortcoming of the 
Russian leadership. 
Returning now to the time that Lenin wrote his book we have to 
ask what then was the significance of the controversy on Machism. 
The Russian revolutionary movement comprised wider circles of intel- 
lectuals than Western socialism; so part of them came under the 
influence of anti-materialist middle-class trends. It was natural that 
Lenin should sharply take up the fight against such tendencies. He 
did not look upon them as would a Marxist who understands them as 
a social phenomenon, explaining them out of their social origin, and 
thus rendering them ineffectual; nowhere in his book do we find an 
attempt at or a trace of such an understanding. To Lenin materialism 
was the truth established by Feuerbach, Marx and Engels, and the 
middle-class materialists ; but then stupidity, reaction, money-inter- 
ests of the bourgeoisie and the spiritual power of theology had brought 
about a revulsion in Europe. Now this corruption threatened to assail 
bolshevism too'; so it had to be opposed with the utmost vigor. 
In this action Lenin of course was entirely right. To be sure, it 
was not a question of the truth of &rx or Mach, nor whether out of 
Mach's ideas something could be used in Marxisem. It was the question 
whether middle-class materialism or middle-class idealism, or some 
mixture, would afford the theoretical basis for the fight against 
Czarism. It is clear that the ideology of a self-contented, already 
declining bourgeoisie can never .fit in with a rising movement, not 
even with a rising middle-class itself. It would have led to weakness, 
where unfolding of the utmost vigor was necessary. Only the rigor 
of materialism could make the Party hard, such as was needed for 
a revolution. The tendency of Machism, somehow parallel to revision- 
ism in Germany, was to break the radicalism of struggle and the solid 
unity of the party, in theory and in practice. This was the danger 
that Lenin saw quite clearly. "When I read it (Bogdanov's book) 
I became exceedingly provoked and enraged," he wrote to Gorki, 
February 1908. Indeed, we perceive this in the vehemence of his 
attack upon the adversary, in every page of the work; it seems to  
have been written in a continuous fury. It is not a fundamental dis- 
cussion clearing the ideas, as was, for example Engels' book against 
Diihring; i t  is the war-pamphlet of a party leader who has to ward 
off by any means the danger to his party. So it could not be expected 
that he should try really to understand the hostile doctrines; in con- 
sequence of his own m a r x i a n  thinking he could only misinterpret 
and misrepresent them. The only thing needed was to  knock them 
down, to destroy their scientific credit, and thus to expose the.Russian 
Machists as ignorant parrots of reactionary blockheads. 
And he succeeded. His fundamental views were the views of the 
bqlshevigt party at large, as determined by its historical task. As so 
often, Lenin had felt exactly the practical exigencies. Machism was 
condemned and expelled from the party. As a united body the party 
could take its c6urse again, in the van of the working class, towards 
the revolution. 
The words of Deborin quoted in the beginning thus are only par- 
tially true. We cannot speak of a victory of Marxism, when there 
is only question of a so-called refutation of middle-class idealism 
through the idem of middle-class materialism. But doubtless Lenin's 
book was an important feature in the history of the Party, determin- 
ing in a high degree the further development of philosophic opinions 
in Russia. Hereafter the revolution, under the new system of state 
capitalism-a combination of middle-class materialism and the mar- 
xian doctrine of social development, adorned with some dialectic ter- 
minology-was, under the name "Leninism, " proclaimed the official 
State-philosophy. It was the right doctrine for the Russian intellec- 
tuals who, now that natural science and technics formed the basis of 
a rapidly developing production system under their direction, saw 
the future open up before them as the ruling class of an immense 
empire. 

ism against religious belief is to him the theoretical fight accompany- 
ing the class struggle. The limited theoretical opposition between the 
former and the later ruling class appears to him the great world fight 
of ideas which he connects wi,th the proletarian class fight, the essence 
and ideas of which lie far outside his view. Thna in Lenin's philosophy 
the Rumian scheme is transferred upon Western Europe and America; 
the anti-religions tendency of a rising bourgeoisie is transferred to 
the rise of the proletariat. Just as among Qennan reformists at that 
time the division was made between "reaction" and "progress" and 
not according to class but according to political ideology-thu~ con- 
fusing the workers-so here it is made according to religious ideology, 
between reactionaries and free-thinkers. Instead of establishing its 
class-unity against bourgeoisie and State, to get mastesstery over produc- 
tion, the Western proletarian class $3 invited to take up the fight 
against religion. If this book and these ideas of henin had been 
known in 1918 among Western Marxists, surely there would have been 
a more critical attitude against his tactics for world revolution. 
The Third 1nternati6nal aims at a world revolution after the model 
of the Russian revolution and with the same goal. The Russian eco- 
nomic system is state capitalism, there called state-socialism or even 
co&unism, with production directed by a state bureaucracy under 
the leadership of the Communist Party. The state officials, forming 
the new rnling class, have the disposal over the product, hence over 
the anrplns-value, whereas the workers receive wages only, thns fom- 
ing an exploited elass. In  this way it has been possible in the short 
time of aome doeem of years to transform Russia from a primitive 
barbarous country into a modern state of rapidly increasing industry 
on the basis of sdvanced science and technics. According to Com- 
m d t  Party ideas, a similar revolution is needed in the capitalist 
countries, with the working class again aa the active power, leading 
to the overthrow of the bourgeoisie and the organization of produe- 
tion by a state bureaucracy.' The Rmian revolution could be victo- 
rious only because a well-disciplined united bolshevist party led the 
massea, and because in the party the clear insightsand the unyielding 
assurance of Lenin and his friends showed the right way. Thus, in 
the same way, in world revolution the workers have to follow the Com- 
munist Party, leave to it the lead and afterwards the government; 
and the party members have to obey their leaders in rigid discipline. 
Essential are the qualified capable party leaders, the proficient, ex- 
perienced revolutionaries; what is necessary for the masses is the 
belief that the party and its leaders are right. 
In reality, for the working class in the countries of developed 
capitalism, in Western Europe.and America, matters are entirely dif- 
ferent. Its task is not the overthrow of a backward absolutist monar- 
chy. Its task is to vanquish a ruling class commanding the mightiest 
material and spiritual forces the world ever knew. Its object cannot 
be to replace the domination of stockjobbers and monopolists over a 
disorderly production by the domination of state officials over a pro- 
duction regulated from above. Its object is to be itself master of pro- 
duction and itself to regulate labor, the basis of life. Only then is 
capitalism really destroyed. Such an aim cannot be attained by an 
ignorant mass, confident followers of a party presenting itself as an 
expert leadership. It can be attained only if the workers themselves, 
the entire class, understand the conditions, ways and means of their 
fight; when every man knows from his own judgment what to do. 
They must, every man of them, act themselves, decide themselves, 
hence think out and know for themselves. Only in this way will a 
real class organization be built up from below, having the form of 
something like workers' councils. It is of no avail that they have been 
coneced that their leaders know what is afoot and have gained the 
point m theoretical disoussion-an easy thing when each is acquainted 
with the writings of his own party only. Out of the contest of argu- 
ments they have to form a clear opinion themselves. There is no truth 
lying ready at hand that has only to be imbibed; in every new case a 
truth must be contrived by exertion of one's own brain. 
This does not mean, of course, that every worker should judge on 
scientific arguments in fields, that -can be mastered only by profes- 
sional study. It means, first, that a11 workers should give attention 
not pnly to their direct working and living conditions but also to the 
great social issues connected with their class struggle and the organi- 
zation of labor; and should know how to take decisions here. But it. 
implies, secondly, a certain standard of argument in propaganda and 
political strife. When the views of the opponent are rendered in a 
distorted way because the willingness or the capacity to understand ' 
them is lacking, then in the eyes of the believing adherents you may 
score a success; but the only resultintended indeed in party strife- . 
is to bind them with stronger fanaticism to the party. For the work- 
ers however, what is of importance is not the increase of power of a 
party but the increase of their own capacity to seize power and to 
establish their mastery over society. Only when, in arguing and dis- 
cussing, the opponent is given his full pound, when in weighing argu- 
ments against one another each solid opinion is understood out of 
social class relations, will the participant hearers gain such well- 
founded insight as i s  necessary for a working class to assure its 
freedom. 
The working class needs Marxism for its liberation. Just as the 
results of natural science are necessary for the technical construction 
of capitalism, so the results of social science are necessary for the 
organizational construction of communism. What was needed first 
was political economy, that part of Marxism that expounds the etruc- 
ture of capitalism, the nature of exploitation, the class-antagonism, 
the tendencies of economic development. It gave, directly, a solid 
basis to the spontaneously arising fight of the workers against the . 
capitalist masters. Then, in the further struggle, by its theory of the 
development of society from primitibe economy through capitalism 
to communism, it gave confidence and enthusiasm'through the pros- 
pect of victory and freedom. When the not yet numerous workers 
took up their first difficult fight, and the hopeless indifferent masses 
had to be roused, this insight was the first thing needed. 
When the working clam has grown more numerous, more power- 
ful, and society is full of the proletarian class struggle, another part 
of Marxism has to come to the forefront. That they should know that 
they are exploited and have to fight, is not the main point any more; 
they must know how to fight, how to overcome their weakness, how to 
build up their uriity and strength. Their economic position is so easy 
to understand, their exploitation so manifest that their unity in strug- 
gle, their common will to seize power over production should presum- 
ably result at once. What hampers them is chiefly the power of the 
inherited and infused ideas, the formidable spiritual power of the 
middle-class world, enveloping their minds into a thick cloud of beliefs 
and ideologies, dividing them, and making them uncertain and con- 
fused. The process of enlightenment, of clearing up and vanquishing 
this world of old ideas and ideologies is the essential process of build- 
ing the working-class power, is the progress of revblution. Here that 
part of Marxism is needed that we call its philosophy, the relation of 
ideas to reality. 
Among these ideologies the least significant is religion. As the 
withered husk of a system of ideas reflecting conditions of a far past, 
it has only an imaginary power as a refuge for all, who are frightened 
by capitalist development. Its basis has been continually undermined 
by capitalism itself. Middle-class philosophy then put up in its place 
the belief in all those lesser idols, deified abstractions, such as matter, 
force, causality in nature, liberty and progress in society. In modern 
times these now forsaken idols have been replaced by new, more pow- 
erful objects of veneration : state and nation. In the struggle of the 
old and the new bourgeoisies for world power, nationalism, now the 
most needed ideology, rose to such power as to carry with it even 
broad masses of the workers. Most important are, besides, such spiri- 
tual powers as democracy, organization, union, party, because they 
have their roots in the working class itself as results of their life 
practice, their own struggle. Just because there is connected with 
them the remembrance of passionate exertion, of devoted sacrifices, 
of feverish conerg with victory or defeat, their merit-which la wund 
as a tool to thorn particular past times and conditions--is exalted 
to the belief in their abwlute excellence. That makes the transition 
to  new necessities under new conditions difficult. The conditions 'of 
We frequently compel the workers to take up new forms of fight; 
but the old traditions can hamper snd retard it in a serious way. In 
the continuous contest between inherited ideolom and practical needs, 
it iE3 aent ia l  for the workers to understand that their ideas are not 
independently exiatina; t ru th  but generabations of former exper& 
encer, and necessitia; that human mind always has the tendency to 
atsign-to such ideas an unlimited validity, as absolutely good or bad, 
venerated or hated, and thus makes the people slaves to superstition; 
but that by understanding limits and conditions, superstition is van- 
quished and thought is made free. And, conversely, what is recognized 
as the lasting interest, as the essential baais of the fight for hia class. 
must be unerringly kept in mind-though without being deified- 
as the brilliant guiding star in all action. This-besides its we as 
explanation of daily 'experience and class struggle-is the significance 
of M8XXian philosophy, the doctrine of the connection of world and 
mind, as conceived by Marx, Engels, and Dietegen; this gives strength 
to the working clam to accomplish its great task of self-liberation. 
Lenin's book, on the other hand, tries to ,impose upon the readers 
the author's belief in the reality of abstractions. So it cannot be help- 
ful in any way for the workers' tad. And as a matter of fact its 
publication in Western languages was not meant to be that. Workers 
aiming a t  the self-liberation of their class stand beyond the horizon 
of the Communist Party. What the Communist Party can see is  the 
competitor,- the rival party, the Second Inte-ational trying to keep 
the leadership over the working class. Bs Deborin wee quoted in the 
. Preface, the aim of the publication was to win social-democracy, cor- 
rupted by middle-class idealistic phil~sophy, back to materialism- 
or else to browbeat it by the more captivating radical terms of mate- 
rialism-= a theoretical contribution to the Red Front. For the 
rising class-movement of the workem it matters little which of these 
unmarxian party-lines of thought should get the upper hand. 
But in another way Lenin's philosophy may be of importance for 
their struggle. The aim of the Communist Party-which it called 
world-revolution-is to bring to power, by means of the fighting force 
of the workers, a layer of leaders who then establish planned produc- 
tion by means of State-Power; in its essence it coincides with the 
aims of mia l  democracy. The social ideals growing up in the minds 
of the intellectual c l w  now that it feel$ its increasing importance in 
the proem of production : a well-ordered organization of production 
for we under the direction of technical and scientific experts-are 




